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Divorce Involving Domestic Violence:
Is Med-Arb Likely to be the
Solution?
Dafna Lavi*
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1

Domestic violence is a complex problem facing today’s society.

In recent decades we are unhappily witnessing an increase in two social
phenomena: One, a dramatic increase in the incidence of domestic violence
against women2 and the second, an increase in the rate of divorce. There are
cases in which a couple may be part of both trends. Such couples, who are
in the process of dissolving their marital bond and who have a history of
domestic violence in the course of their marriage are the subject of this
article, and the issue shall be termed ‘divorce cases involving violence.’
The academic discourse regarding this issue, examining whether divorce
cases involving violence can suitably be handled in mediation proceedings,
compares how such cases are handled by the mediation process and how
they are handled by the judicial process. In effect, this discourse has
developed against the background of the disappointment with the judicial
process and from the manner of handling such cases. Proponents of
mediation and its suitability for handling divorce cases involving violence
point to the disadvantages of the judicial process while opponents of
mediation point to its disadvantages. The problem arising from this
discourse is precisely the fact that it is convincing! In other words, an
examination of the discourse discloses that those who express serious
reservations regarding the efficacy of the judicial process in handling such
* Ph.D. (Law, Direct Doctoral Track) 2003, L.L.B. 1996, Bar-Ilan University; Assistant Professor,
Sha’arei Mishpat Law College. My thanks to Arie Frank, Benjamin Shmueli, Susan Zaidel, and all
the others with whom I have discussed this article, for their enlightening comments. I also thank the
editors and staff of the Dispute Resolution Law Journal from the bottom of my heart for their
devoted and professional work.
1. K. Loomis, Comment: Domestic Violence and Mediation: A Tragic Combination for
Victims in California Family Court, 35 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 355 (1999).
2. See Jeske, supra note 1, at 671. “Currently in the United States, ‘… on average three
women are murdered each day their husbands or boyfriends.’” Id.
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cases are correct, but those opposing the use of mediation, pointing out its
failures and serious disadvantages in terms of handling such cases are also
correct. These failures and disadvantages have not yet been satisfactorily
resolved, in spite of empirical attempts at improvement, alongside a great
deal of writing being done in the field.3 This article proposes, therefore, a
third solution: Med-arb.
Med-arb is a hybrid process of two stages for dispute resolution that
integrates mediation with arbitration and combines the advantages of both
processes. This process, one of the most innovative methods of ADR, has
been gaining in popularity in recent years in various countries around the
world and in the various areas of applicability. After surveying the existing
situation (as reflected in the academic discourse), regarding the judicial
system’s handling of divorce cases involving violence and the failures of
that system, as well as the handling of these cases through mediation and the
limitations of that process in dealing with such cases, this article proposes,
perhaps for the first time, the med-arb process for the handling of such cases,
asserting that due to the special structure of this process (as well as its
advantages) it holds unique promise for such cases. The article examines,
therefore, the possibilities of implementing med-arb as a further and
complementary solution for the party to a divorce who is the victim of
domestic violence where neither the judicial nor the mediation process
managed to provide satisfactory redress for the victim.
This article includes six chapters in addition to the first chapter, the
introduction.
The second chapter presents statistics regarding the
phenomenon of domestic violence and presents the definition of “violence”
(with its attendant difficulties). The third chapter presents the existing
problems regarding the judicial handling of divorce cases in general and
those involving violence in particular. The fourth chapter analyzes the
academic discourse regarding the issue of mediation of divorce cases
involving violence (the position of the proponents and the opponents, as well
as the problems of the current situation). The fifth chapter proposes med-arb
as addressing the issue of divorce mediation in the presence of domestic
violence and the problems presented by the current situation. The sixth
chapter includes the recommendations of the article and the seventh chapter
is a concluding chapter.

3.

Regarding these efforts at improvement see infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
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CHAPTER TWO: DIVORCE CASES INVOLVING VIOLENCE
A. Statistics
Fifty percent of couples now entering mediation programs have experienced domestic
4
violence.

In recent decades there has been a steady increase in the rate of divorce
and many divorcing couples have children.5 In addition, the statistics
demonstrate that there is on-going violence in at least a quarter of American
homes.6 The vast majority (90%–95%) of domestic abuse victims are
women.7 Violence between couples occurs every 15 seconds in the United
States.8
B. The Definition of “Violence”
When discussing “domestic violence,” the emphasis is on behavioral
patterns including elements of control of one spouse by the other through
coercive means. Such behavior is likely to include physical attack, sexual
assault, financial abuse, psychological abuse and emotional abuse.9 The
4. Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 194 (2003).
Another study cites figures of 50% to 80%. Jennifer P. Maxwell, Mandatory Mediation of Custody
in the Face of Domestic Violence: Suggestions for Courts and Mediators, 37 FAM. & CONCILIATION
CTS. REV. 335, 335 (1999).
5. Id. at 159–160. See Jeske, supra note 1, at 657.
6. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 148.
7. Id. at 149.
8. Jeske, supra note 1, at 670. “‘One out of nearly every three women will be the victim of
domestic violence in her lifetime.’ . . . Further, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention report
that United States women experience two million injuries from domestic violence annually. It
appears this trend has filtered down to younger girls, who may later become ensconced in the
dynamics of domestic abuse and face child custody issues as well. Indeed, it is reported that
approximately one in three adolescent girls in the United States is a victim of physical, emotional or
verbal abuse from a dating partner.” Id.
9. Megan Thompson, Mandatory Mediation and Domestic Violence: Reformulating the
Good-Faith Standard, 86 OR. L. REV. 599, 613 (2007). Thompson provides a definition: “Domestic
violence is a pattern of behaviors that one partner uses to establish power and control over the other
partner. A batterer may use physical, emotional, psychological, or sexual violence, manifested
through behaviors that include intimidation, coercion, threats, isolation, financial control, and
insults.” See also Jeske, supra note 1, at 694 (“Domestic violence is a broad concept encompassing
behaviors ranging from ‘isolated incidents to patterns of repeated violence involving physical,
sexual, and emotional abuse that controls the victim.’”). Jeske notes that several generally accepted
concepts are used to define domestic violence, e.g., “coercive controlling violence,” “situational
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legal definition of the term “domestic violence” appears in the Model Code
on Domestic and Family Violence:
“Domestic or family violence” means the occurrence of one or more of the following acts
by a family or household member, but does not include acts of self-defense:
(a) Attempting to cause or causing physical harm to another family or household
member;
(b) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical harm; or
(c) Causing a family or household member to engage involuntarily in sexual activity by
10
force, threat of force, or duress.

This definition places the emphasis on physical abuse. However, there
are broader definitions, including one proffered by some social scientists,
according to which:
Domestic violence is a pattern of coercive behavior that changes the dynamics of an
intimate relationship within which it occurs. Once the pattern of coercive control is
established, both parties understand differently the meaning of specific actions and
words. Domestic violence is not simply a list of discrete behaviors, but is patterns .†.†.
and gestures, which, taken together, establish power and control over an intimate
11
partner.

The current academic literature notes that it is not possible to point to
one prototype for the term “domestic violence,”12 and that there is relevance

couple violence,” “separation-instigated violence,” “violence resistance,” “intimate partner sexual
assault.” Id. at 663–70. Regarding the nature, the dynamics, and the history of domestic violence,
see Thompson, supra at 612–16. See also Susan Landrum, The Ongoing Debate About Mediation in
the Context of Domestic Violence: A Call for Empirical Studies of Mediation Effectiveness, 12
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 425, 430 (2011). Landrum also notes various distinctions between
types of domestic violence, which are relevant to the decision as to whether to engage in mediation
in order to terminate the marriage: “Scholars have also begun to differentiate between different types
of domestic violence and to argue that the type may matter when determining whether a couple can
effectively mediate. For example, Joan Kelly and Michael Johnson have defined four different types
of domestic violence: coercive controlling violence, violent resistance, situational couple violence,
and separation-instigated violence. Kelly and Johnson define coercive controlling violence, also
sometimes called ‘intimate terrorism,’ as ‘a pattern of emotionally abusive intimidation, coercion,
and control coupled with physical violence against partners.’ Coercive controlling violence is what
most people typically associate with domestic violence. The second type of domestic violence,
violent resistance, has also been defined as ‘female resistance,’ ‘resistive/reactive violence,’ and
‘self-defense.’ Situational couple violence is a ‘type of partner violence that does not have its basis
in the dynamic of power and control.’ Finally, separation-instigated violence is a term used to
describe violence that does not occur until a couple is in the process of ending their relationship.
Kelly and Johnson believe that an understanding of the different types of domestic violence can lead
to better screening processes.” Id. at 432–33. See also Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 152–58.
10. MODEL CODE ON DOMESTIC AND FAMILY VIOLENCE, Sec. 102 (1994).
11. Mary Ann Dutton, Expert Witness Testimony, in THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON
YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE, ABA COMMISSION ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Sec. 8-81, Sec. 8-8 (Deborah
M. Goelman et. al., eds., 1996).
12. Elayne E. Greenberg Beyond the Polemics: Realistic Options to Help Divorcing Families
Manage Domestic Violence, 24 ST. JOHN’S J. OF LEGAL COMMENT. 603, 608 (2011).
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to the categorization of each of the types of violence for purposes of coming
up with an appropriate solution for each case, in recognition of the fact that
“cookie cutter responses or one-size-fits-all solutions will not do.”13 This
insight regarding the need to relate differently to different kinds of abuse
paves the way for adopting med-arb in various cases, as will be discussed in
Chapter Five below.14
CHAPTER THREE: CONCERNS ABOUT ADVERSARIAL DIVORCE IN HANDLING
DIVORCES
The notion that ordinary people want black-robed judges and well-dressed lawyers and
courtrooms as settings to resolve their disputes is not correct. People with problems, like
people with pains, want relief and they want it as quickly and inexpensively as possible.15

In recent decades there has been a great deal of questioning of the
degree to which the judicial process is equipped to deal with divorce in
general and divorces involving domestic violence in particular. The
common assertion is that in spite of the fact that the legal process has a long
history of dealing with disputes of this nature, it is not capable of providing
true relief of the pain of the conflict and in many cases it may exacerbate it.16
A. Divorce Cases—in General
Parties involved in divorce and custody cases are often hurt, angry,
fearful, and above all, very vulnerable. The parties to a divorce are
adversaries in a very personal sense, and personal problems are emotional,
which complicates the substantive problems, exacting a high price from the
couple and their children. The end of a marriage is widely viewed as an
emotionally fraught experience in which the parties almost always view one

Greenberg mentions the distinction made by Janet Johnston, who defined five typologies of
domestic violence: “Ongoing or male episodic battering, female-initiated violence, male-controlled
interactive violence, separation and post-divorce violence, and violence stemming from psychotic
and paranoid reactions.” Id. at 608.
13. Id. at 608.
14. See infra Chapter Five Med–Arb—The Proposed Solution.
15. P.M. Lisnek, A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION 105
(1993).
16. Marsha B. Freeman, Comparing Philosophies and Practices of Family Law Between the
United States and Other Nations: The Flintstones vs. The Jetsons, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 249, 249
(2010).
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another as opponents.17 The adversarial system that is an inherent part of the
judicial process only serves to exacerbate the problem. The adversarial
approach views the parties as rivals fighting for their share of a limited pie
of resources. The litigation “game” becomes a zero sum game, in which one
party prevails at the expense of the other. The conflict is fueled by the
litigation, often contributing directly to the complete emotional destruction
of the couple and their children. The litigation process, “which often
includes an assessment for purposes of custody [determination], observation
of the parents with their children, [and] psychological and psychiatric
evaluations,” directly and significantly contributes to the trauma that the
family experiences. “The evaluations, by their very nature, are intrusive and
cause each parent to focus upon the shortcomings of the other,” thereby
exacerbating the conflict and increasing the level of hostility. Studies
demonstrate the serious repercussions in terms of the emotional state of the
children and the cumulative negative effects as the process continues in a
combative manner.18 These findings have given rise to the idea that parties
in cases of this kind need a system that will provide them with some degree
of emotional and financial stability. They need to be able to focus upon the
financial and psychological well-being of their family.
The judicial system operates upon the assumption that the judge can
make an objective determination as to who is right and who is not, what the
best outcome is for the family and what the correct solution is.19 However,
according to its critics, in divorce cases this process ignores the emotional
and psychological aspects of the conflict and puts the judges in an untenable
position because most of them have not undergone sufficient training in such
subjects.20 In effect, the judges are expected to solve problems within the
family that neither the parties nor even professionals in the field would be
able to solve.21
Regarding the litigants themselves, a recent study found that 50 to 70
percent of couples involved in divorce litigation assert that the judicial
system is “impersonal” and threatening.22 Their dissatisfaction focuses on
the fact that the judicial process served to increase their feelings of anger and

17. Jordan Leigh Santeramo, Special Issue: Models of Collaboration in Family Law: Student
Note: Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2004) .
18. Dafna Lavi, Can the Leopard Change His Spots?! Reflections on the ‘Collaborative Law’
Revolution and Collaborative Advocacy, 13(1) CARDOZO JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 61,
66–67 (2012); Steegh, supra note 5, at 167–68.
19. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 162.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. MARY R. CATCHART & ROBERT E. ROBLES, PARENTING OUR CHILDREN: IN THE BEST
INTEREST OF THE NATION 11, 39 (1996).
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hostility towards their spouse.23 Divorcing couples described the litigation
process as lengthy, expensive, inefficient and disempowering.24
Freeman summarizes this point:
Legal pundits, practitioners, judges, psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers and
virtually anyone who has dealt with families in distress due to divorce or related issues
have agreed for years that the family law legal system is broken. Parties remain angry
years after the initial hurt, relationships crack under stress, and most difficult of all,
children are unable to maintain meaningful and positive associations with their family
members. While everyone involved in litigious family law proceedings, most especially
the parents, likely believe, or at least convince themselves, that they are acting in the
children’s best interests, the reality is that this system creates unnecessary turmoil in
everyone, particularly the children, separate and apart from the difficulties inherent in the
25
initial breakup itself.

And indeed, these critical insights regarding the judicial process have
given rise, in the last few decades, in a number of countries, to a trend of
transition to non-litigious methods for resolving family matters, foremost
among them being mediation.26
B. Divorce Cases Involving Domestic Violence
Specifically with regard to divorce cases in which violence is involved,
the doubts with respect to the degree of suitability of the adversarial system
are even greater. In academic discourse, it is asserted again and again that in
such cases where a dangerous conflict already exists, the adversarial system,
which by its nature exacerbates the conflict, is particularly likely to be
harmful.27
Firstly, in divorce cases complicated by domestic violence, the conflict
is likely to be escalated in a particularly severe manner. The increased
hostility between the parents has, in extreme cases, led to the murder of the
parent who has been the victim of the abuse, or of the children, followed by
suicide of the violent parent.28
23. Marsha Kline Pruett & Tamara D. Jackson, The Lawyer’s Role During the Divorce
Process: Perceptions of Parents, Their Young Children, and Their Attorneys, 33 FAM. L. Q. 283,
298 (1999).
24. Id. at 299–300.
25. Freeman, supra note 17, at 249 (emphasis added).
26. Id. “There is a national movement in the family law practice area toward ‘alternative
dispute resolution,’ as opposed to litigation, as the first and favored method to resolve custody
disputes.” Jeske, supra note 1, at 673.
27. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 162–63.
28. Jeske, supra note 1, at 658.
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Secondly, in such cases, the traditional fault-based inquiry of the courts,
focusing on whether domestic violence has indeed occurred, often fails to
arrive at an accurate determination. Batterers often appear to be more
credible witnesses, while victims may lack credibility. Moreover, emotional
abuse is extremely difficult to prove in accordance with the rules of
evidence, and cognitive dissonance makes it difficult to accept horrific
allegations.29 Furthermore, many domestic violence cases come before the
courts as contested custody and child support cases, with the element of
violence being concealed by these labels. The adversarial system has been
widely recognized as ineffective in promoting justice in such cases.30
Greenberg, in her criticism of the judicial process and the degree to
which it is appropriate for handling divorce cases involving violence,
analyzes five painful realities based, inter alia, on empirical studies:
1. There is no agreement about what constitutes domestic violence.
2. There is no fool-proof screening for domestic violence.
3. Courts have been ineffective in stopping many forms of violence.
4. Batterers are statistically more successful than survivors at securing custody of their
children.
31
5. Children are the casualties of their family’s violence.

When questions of custody are being determined, the victim is likely to
lose out due to “the lack of awareness about domestic violence, the failure to
link battering and parenting under the law and the proliferation of ‘friendly
parent’ provisions.”32
It seems that the fact that violence exists is not adequately taken into
account by the courts in rendering decisions regarding child custody or
visitation rights. Studies demonstrate that the abusive parent sometimes
prevails in custody battles.33 However, even when the victim is awarded
sole custody, the visitation rights of the other parent are likely to constitute a
problem. At times the courts do not pay sufficient attention to questions of
security related to such visits, giving the violent party the opportunity to
manipulate the family.34 Moreover, many victims of domestic violence are
reluctant to take legal recourse against their attackers due to concerns about
the attendant publicity, the implications for their family’s reputation, and the
ability to keep the family together.35
29. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 605.
30. Id. at 605–06.
31. Id. at 606–12.
32. Id.
33. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 169.
34. Id. at 168–69.
35. Sarah Rogers, Online Dispute Resolution: An Option for Mediation in the Midst of
Gendered Violence, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 349, 367–68 (2009).
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We can summarize this discussion of the judicial handling of divorce
cases involving violence by stating that although the judicial process has a
long-standing history of providing solutions in family law cases, the degree
to which it succeeds in protecting the family’s interests when cases
involving violence are being adjudicated is questionable.36 It must be
remembered that:
For a victim of domestic violence, a process that is expensive, increases hostility, requires
lengthy and ongoing contact with the batterer, and removes her ability to make
empowered decisions is far from a perfect solution. Given these problems, requiring that
37
domestic violence cases be litigated is not an ideal solution.

In addition to the above-mentioned failures regarding the way the
judicial process deals with family law cases involving domestic violence, a
number of feminist also raise arguments concerning this manner of dealing
with the problem. Among other things, the assertion is that the judicial
process does not adequately fulfill the function of “giving a voice” to
women (and therefore, a better option for resolution of disputes should be
developed). Feminists point to the “female voice” being systematically
pushed out of the legal arena, blurred, ignored or subsumed within the “male
voice.” The assertion is that the “female voice” tends not to be heard in
public and formal situations, e.g., formal negotiations or judicial
The negative aspect of the judicial process in this
proceedings.38
constellation is the fact that it shuts out and mutes the female voice, thereby
contributing, in practice, to the cycle of oppression of the victim.39

36. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 159–70.
37. Thompson, supra note 10, at 620–21.
38. Liora Bilsky, The Violence of Silence: The Legal Procedure Between Allocation and
Voice, 23 TEL-AVIV U.L.J. 421 (2000).
39. Id. at 437–38. Knowlton & Mulhauser also note, “[m]y experience, however, leads me to
believe that the courtroom is the place where victims most often feel humiliated, embarrassed,
controlled, and discredited….” Douglas D. Knowlton & Tara Lea Muhlhauser, Mediation in the
Presence of Domestic Violence: Is It the Light at the End of the Tunnel or Is a Train on the Track?,
70 N.D. L. REV. 255, 266 (1994). See also Jeske, supra note 1, at 600–61.
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CHAPTER FOUR: IS MEDIATION LIKELY TO PROVIDE A SOLUTION? THE
EXISTING ACADEMIC DISCUSSION
A. Divorce Mediation in General
Mediation is a process in which a neutral person assists disputing parties
in identifying and discussing issues of concern, exploring various solutions,
and guiding parties toward a settlement agreeable to all of them.40 The
process is volitional and confidential. In cases involving divorce and related
issues, many courts regard mediation as preferable to litigation.41
In handling divorce cases that do not involve violence, the transition to
mediation as an alternative to litigation42 is a common phenomenon. This is
a result of the criticism of the judicial process,43 and for the most part, it
offers many advantages.44 Studies report: high levels of satisfaction with the
mediation process,45 a high rate of achieving settlement agreements,46 very

40. The Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation define mediation as:
“A process in which a mediator, an impartial third party, facilitates the resolution of family dispute
by promoting the participants voluntary agreement. The family mediator assists communication,
encourages understanding and focuses the participants on their individual and common interests. The
family mediator works with the participants to explore options, make decisions and reach their own
agreements.” [Andrew Schepard, An Introduction to the Model Standards of Practice for Family and
Divorce Mediation, 35 FAM. L. Q. 1, 3 (2001).] See also UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2003)
(“‘Mediation’ means a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation
between parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute”); See also:
“A forum in which an impartial person, the mediator, facilitates communication between the parties
to promote conciliation, settlement, or understanding among them.” [Mechtel v. Mechtel, 528
N.W.2d 916, 919 (Minn. App. 1995) (quoting Minnesota Supreme Court-Minnesota State Bar
Association Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Final Report, Appendix D (July 1989)),
as quoted in Vogt v. Vogt, 455 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. 1990).]
41. Cindy Fazzi, ADR and Cases of Domestic Violence, 60 J. DISP. RESOL. 85, 89 (2005).
42. As well as other alternative methods such as ENE and Collaborative Law. See, e.g., Dafna
Lavi, supra note 19; Dafna Lavi, Looking at the End from the Beginning: Early Neutral EvaluationTheoretical and Practical Aspects and a Critical Perspective, 27 BAR-ILAN STUD. 455 (2012);
Yvonne Pearson, Early Neutral Evaluations: Applications to Custody and Parenting Time Cases
Program Development and Implementation in Hennepin County, Minnesota, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 672
(2006); Jordan Leigh Santeramo, Special Issue: Models of Collaboration in Family Law: Student
Note: Early Neutral Evaluation in Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 321 (2004); Christopher M.
Fairman, Growing Pains: Changes in Collaborative Law and the Challenge of Legal Ethics, 30
CAMPBELL L. REV. 237 (2008).
43. See supra, Chapter 3 Concerns about Adversarial Divorce.
44. See supra, notes 26–27 and accompanying text.
45. Studies note that satisfaction from mediation ranges from six to ninety-three percent. Men
and women express almost identical levels of satisfaction from mediation with seventy-eight percent
of the men and seventy-two percent of the women reporting that they are quite satisfied to very
satisfied. Additionally, even among those who did not arrive at settlement agreements, eighty-one
percent would nonetheless recommend the mediation process to a friend. See Ver Steegh, supra
note 5, at 159–70. “In another study, divorcing couples indicated that their interactions with each
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effective results, financial advantages (significantly lower costs than the
judicial route),47 significantly faster resolution of the case, etc.48 Further
significant advantages of the mediation process as opposed to litigation in
such cases are: improvement of relationships (by decreasing hostility), or at
least not exacerbating existing difficulties,49 developing honest means of
communication and conversation about interests, and focusing upon the
child’s best interests. The accepted opinion is that mediation and the
mediator provide a healthier and more constructive and creative atmosphere
to deal with the issues confronting the couple in the process of separating.50
Especially as pertains to the best interests of the child, the idea is that when
couples are in the process of separating, the mediation process focuses on
mutually attacking the problem and striving together to reach agreement,
rather than attacking one another, as happens in litigation. As a result, the
couple has the energy necessary to help their children cope with the
psychological processes and social implications of their parents’ divorce.
Cooperation between the parents saves the children from having to side with
one parent at the expense of the other. The mediation process also
encourages the continued connection between the parents and the children, a
connection that is vital for the proper development of children of all ages.51
It must be remembered that the fundamental premise of mediation is that
it is a process of interests-based negotiation, as contrasted with a discussion
of positions that at times leads each party to become “locked into” his own

other improved following mediation, an outcome that commentators attribute to mediated
agreements that help structure future contacts.” Id. at 190.
46. Id. at 175–76.
47. Most of the studies found that mediation is less expensive than the traditional judicial
process. In one study, couples in mediation realized a savings of 134% of the costs of the divorce
process in comparison to couples who hired two attorneys to handle a judicial process. In another
study, couples saved 42% of attorneys fees. Id. at 174–75.
48. Id. at 174. A number of studies found that mediation processes end in half the time as
compared to the judicial process. Id.
49. Thompson, supra note 10, at 603. It is apparent from studies that “Divorcing couples
indicated that their interactions with each other improved following mediation, an outcome that
commentators attribute to mediated agreements that help structure future contacts.” Id.
50. Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 39, at 259 . It must be remembered that appropriate
dealing with the relationship of separated couples generally requires use of interdisciplinary tools
(e.g., tools from the field of psychology and social work). For this reason as well, mediation is
perceived as more appropriate than the judicial process. And see Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution: When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1902 (1997).
51. Susan Zaidel, THE GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS 39 (2001).
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position.52 In divorce cases, the main advantage of this interests-based focus
over the position-based focus, or rights-based focus, of the judicial process is
that the mediator is more likely to focus upon the concealed needs and
interests of the parties and their children. In this manner, shared interests are
often discovered, particularly regarding the children’s welfare, which may
constitute a basis for a mediation settlement.53
In the following section we will examine whether the picture changes
when the element of violence is introduced.
B. Divorce Mediation Where Violence is Involved
On the face of things, all of the advantages of the mediation process in
divorce cases—enumerated in the previous section—exist, and even more
so, in divorce cases involving violence. The increased popularity of ADR
methods, such as mediation in custody disputes involving domestic violence,
is due to ADR’s less adversarial nature, the enhanced ability of parents to
keep their children out of the conflict, the protection ADR affords for the
parents’ rights, negotiation that is client-centered, and the focus of ADR on
settlement without court involvement.54
However, the issue of divorce mediation in the presence of domestic
violence is one of the most controversial issues in the academic literature.
There are those who believe that mediation will never be appropriate when
violence is involved, others who believe that mediation can appropriately
address the parties’ needs even in such cases, and there are some who
support adopting it as mandatory.55 Below is a survey of the academic
discussion of the subject, the position of the opponents, followed by the
position of the proponents. In the following chapter (Chapter Five), a third
position will be proposed by the author of this article: the adoption of medarb.56

52. Roger Fisher & William Ury, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1981).
53. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 173.
54. Jeske, supra note 1, at 659.
55. See Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at X. Alongside these, there are also intermediate
approaches.
56. See infra Med-Arb – The Proposed Solution.
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(a) The Opponents’ Position
I was forced to sit down with a man who for the past twelve years has abused me,
intimidated me, controlled me by threats and scare tactics, emotionally tore me down and
57
whom I truly fear.

The quote above is an authentic description of a victim of violence who
experienced the mediation process on the way to getting her divorce. The
opponents of mediation in divorce cases involving violence assert that these
matters are not appropriate for mediation.58 Physical violence and
destructive patterns of handling conflict are repeatedly singled out in the
academic literature as cases in which mediation is contraindicated.
Mediators actually dealing with such cases also feel that mediation is not
appropriate for couples that had physical violence or abuse in their homes.
Similarly, mediation is not appropriate in a situation in which both sides are
not free to express themselves and to make decisions without pressure or
threats.59 The main reasons for opposition to mediation in such cases are
presented below.
i.

The Component of Danger

The assertion is that the mediation process inherently endangers the
woman.60 The danger of serious, even life-threatening physical harm is at
issue.61 The very fact that the violent husband knows the precise time when
the wife will be present at mediation meetings exposes her to serious

57. Andree Gagnon, Ending Mandatory Divorce Mediation for Battered Women, 15 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 272, 279 (Spring, 1992).
58. Kara Utzig, Comment: Entering the Debate on Spousal Abuse Divorce Mediation: Safely
Managing Divorce Mediation When Domestic Violence is Discovered, 7 CIRCLES BU. W. L. & SOC.
POL. 51, 52 (1999). “Opponents argue that one should never mediate divorce matters when domestic
violence is present.” See also Gagnon, supra note 58, at 279; Penelope Bryan, Killing Us Softly:
Divorce Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441 (1992); Trina Grillo, The
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J 1545 (1991); Lisa G. Lerman,
Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984).
59. Zaidel, supra note 52, at 65.
60. See also Maxwell, supra note 5, at 337; Landrum, supra note 10, at 438–44 .
61. Maxwell, supra note 5, at 346. “Addressing the ethical and legal considerations of
intervention with victims of domestic violence, Dutton (1992) cautions that ‘a breach of
confidentiality when working with a battered woman could place her at risk for serious physical
injury or death.’”
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danger.62 This danger may also await the mediator. Those raising this
assertion point to legislation in twenty states of the United States that
explicitly forbid the use of the mediation process in divorce cases involving
violence.63 The argument is that mediation is not equipped to provide the
woman with the protection she needs in the course of the process itself or
afterwards.64 The periods of the most serious violence occur in response to
the victim’s attempt to leave the violent husband. At that point, the husband
becomes desperate, feels his loss of control over his victim, and as a result is
“pushed” to the use of desperate measures, in an attempt to retain his control
over the wife. While the courts can issue protective orders where there is
threat of violence from the husband, such tools are not available in the
mediation process.65 Additionally, one should remember that it is not always
possible to evaluate, in advance, the existence of present danger or its extent.
Even the most violent of husbands is almost always equipped with a “public
face.”66 A mediator can never acquire precise information regarding the
conduct of the violent husband the moment the mediation session ends.67
Studies have found that mediation is less successful in preventing repeat
violence than is the traditional judicial process. While 17% of violent
husbands resorted to violence again after a mediation process, only 10% of
violent husbands who had gone through a legal process, such as arrest,
returned to the use of violence against their wives or former wives. Studies
point to the fact that the phenomenon of violence after a mediation process is
more common as opposed to violence after a judicial process.68 It seems that
judicial processes permit the operation of two mechanisms of deterrence:
preventing the violent husband’s access to his wife and an effective sanction.
Mediation does not permit this deterrent. The assertion, therefore, is that in
comparison to the judicial process, the mediation process puts the woman at
a greater risk of physical harm. Moreover, the final product of the mediation
62. Utzig, supra note 58, at 56–57. And Jessica Pearson, Mediating When Domestic Violence
Is a Factor: Policies and Practices in Court-Based Divorce Mediation Programs, 14 HARV.
WOMEN’S L. MEDIATION Q. 319, 320 (1997).
63. Utzig, supra note 58, at 56.
64. Rogers, supra note 35, at 365–66.
65. See Loomis, supra note 2, at 366. See also Penelope Bryan, Women’s Freedom to
Contract at Divorce: A Mask for Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1221 (1999) (“The
risk of violence escalates when the abused wife attempts to break the abuser’s control by leaving
him.”).
66. See also Thompson, supra note 10, at 616. Batterers are often skilled at manipulation and
may charm outsiders. Id. Indeed, people outside a battering relationship generally characterize
batterers as ‘generous, caring, and good,’ since batterers typically act violently at home and calmly
in public. Id. To an outside observer, therefore, a batterer may seem more “dominant, charming,
agreeable, and socially facile in comparison to his less assertive wife.” Id.
67. Maxwell, supra note 5, at 345.
68. Loomis, supra note 2, at 366.
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process, i.e., the settlement, cannot provide a solution based on real
protection of the woman. The mediation settlement is not equipped to
provide the necessary protection to the woman from the violent husband.
This is as opposed to all of the enforcement measures of the criminal and
civil justice systems against violent husbands who do not abide by court
orders issued against them.69
This reason for opposition may be summarized by the words of
Knowlton & Muhlhauser.70 The authors assert that just as a violent husband
does not belong in therapy groups for married couples, he similarly does not
belong at the mediation table. As long as the component of violence is in
the picture, having him participate in a mediation process means
compromising the safety of the wife in a very real way. Such a compromise
is, of course, unacceptable.
ii. Disparity of Power between the Parties
By definition, when domestic violence is present in a relationship, there is a disparity of
71
power.

. . . [A history] of domestic violence has the potential to create insurmountable power
72
imbalances.

Once violence enters into the picture, the parties cannot approach the
mediation table on an equal basis. Violence, by its very definition, includes
a component of disparity of power and imbalance between the violent party
and his victim.73 The presumption is that disparities of power between the
parties in mediation are likely to lead to negative results, which would not be
the same in a judicial process, as set forth below.74
1) One of the serious concerns noted in the academic literature is that
the victim will act out of fear and tend to make too many concessions due to
69. Pearson, supra note 62, at 320.
70. Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 39, at 268.
71. Maxwell, supra note 5, at 345.
72. Landrum, supra note 10, at 437.
73. Utzig, supra note 58, at 53–54. Most of those who write on the subject of domestic
violence identify it as a means to exercise power and control over the victim. The assertion is that a
process that brings the parties (the violent party and the victim) to the table as equals, is defective
and the last thing that is appropriate in view of the existing dynamic, as stated, in such a relationship.
See, Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra, note 39, at 267.
74. Landrum, supra note 10, at 438.
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the power disparity.75 The assertion is that a mediation settlement based on
fear lacks the necessary element of truly free consent, and, is consequently
defective and inappropriate.76 If the victim and her violent husband arrive at
a divorce settlement in a mediation process, the probability increases that
provisions will be included that are unfair to the woman, with respect both to
child custody and to financial matters.77 One must remember that the violent
husband is likely to frighten his wife with the use of verbal or non-verbal
threats of future violence, as a way of achieving a power advantage. In such
a relationship, even without an outright threat, the wife is likely to feel
impotent in terms of standing up for her interests.78
The wife’s fear is even likely to bring about concessions in advance
regarding relevant topics such as financial matters.79 Alternatively, the fear
may cause the wife’s “agreement” to discuss matters that are normally
subject to a “procedural veto” in this type of dispute (e.g., the husband’s
visitation rights or joint custody of children, which present a real danger to
her and the children). Beyond the wife’s rights, which are likely to be
infringed upon, the rights of the third party—the children—should be taken
into account. A defective settlement that is arrived at due to disparity of
powers between the parties, fear and negation of the truly free will of the
wife, may have dire implications for the children as well.80
2) Moreover, it must be remembered that abuse is also likely to include
financial abuse,81 when the husband has absolute control of all of the
financial means and deprives the wife of any information concerning their
financial circumstances or access to means of payment. Disparate financial
power such as this82 is likely to bring the wife to the mediation negotiations

75. Pearson, supra note 62, at 320.
76. See Maxwell, supra note 5, at 338.
77. Bryan, supra note 66, at 1224. See also Landrum, supra note 10, at 438–39.
78. Landrum, supra note 10, at 438.
79. Bryan, supra note 65, at 1225.
80. See Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 40, at 268. According to Knowlton &
Muhlhauser, there is documentation to the effect that mediation settlement agreements generally
involve custody arrangements, including broad visitation rights. Id. Studies reveal that about
seventy percent of the children in families in which the mother is the victim of violence by her
husband are also the victims of physical abuse. Id. See also Pearson, supra note 63, at 320 (“Many
mediation critics are troubled by the conjoint and compromising nature of the mediation process and
fear that mediators favor joint custody arrangements, which often run counter to what is best for the
victim and children.”).
81. Utzig, supra note 59, at 65; see also Bryan, supra note 66, at 1220 (“Although most
husbands exercise the lion’s share of control over marital finance, abusive husbands typically
exercise extreme financial control.”); R. L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the
Family Law Practitioner 29 FAM. LAW QUARTERLY 187, 189 (1995).
82. See Bryan, supra note 66, at 1220 (“Moreover, her abuser likely has compromised her
work performance and participation, making her a difficult employee. After separation, she may still
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table in the first place, not as a matter of free choice, but rather in the
absence of an alternative, for lack of financial resources to hire a trial
attorney.83
3) The violent husband weakens the wife, which is sometimes
manifested by a isolation of the woman from the outside world. With the
objective of retaining his total control over her and maintaining her absolute
dependence (physical, emotional,84 financial, etc.) on him, the violent
husband often isolates his wife from any outside environment whatsoever.
Professionals talk about the fact that in an ironic manner, it is precisely in
such a situation that the wife often develops absolute and exclusive
dependency upon her violent husband. This is a direct result of years of
isolation from the outside world, of prohibitions and distance from relatives
and friends, sanctions for leaving the house without the husband’s approval,
etc. All of these strengthen the violent husband’s means of control over the
wife and, in a paradoxical manner, heightens the wife’s dependence on him,
increasing the disparity of power between them and the absolute denial of
her freedom of choice.85
4) At times the disparity of power between the parties is so great that it
is no longer possible to speak only of denial of the wife’s free choice or of
her independence, but rather of annulment of her very being.
The husband at times sets forth rules of expected conduct that he later
uses to justify the physical abuse (i.e., in the case that his wife has violated
one of his rules). In this situation, the wife is likely to develop an allconsuming obsession with doing the husband’s bidding and satisfying him,
in order not to give him any further excuse to take out his anger on her.
Since the reason for his outburst is likely to be a minor, unimportant detail,
and since the warning she gets is often very short (if there is any warning at
all), the wife tends to develop obsessive behavior in the guise of ensuring the
husband’s continual happiness, regardless of whether such behavior is
rational. In effect, she is likely to enter into the mold of wiping out her own
identity and desires.86 This “programming” to acquiesce to and satisfy all of
have difficulty locating employment and earning the funds she needs to hire a lawyer. Finally, the
battered wife may lack the financial knowledge necessary to accurately assess her financial needs
and develop a realistic post-divorce financial plan.”).
83. Utzig, supra note 59, at 62–63 .
84. See Bryan, supra note 66, at 1222 (“Additionally, a batterer frequently isolates his victim
from family and friends, depriving her of the emotional support she might need to confront him.”).
85. See also J. M. Truss, The Subjection of Women… Still: Unfulfilled Promises of Protection
for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149, 1167–68 (1995).
86. Loomis, supra note 2, at 362.
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the violent husband’s needs and demands, while canceling out herself, is so
deep that at times it does not end with the signaling of the end of the
marriage in the mediation process. In other words, mediation that signals
the end of the marriage cannot be “relied” upon to bring about a change in
this way of behavior and thinking that has accompanied the wife throughout
her entire married life. A woman who believes that she has survived until
this point due to her obedience to the husband’s rules and satisfying his
needs is likely to find it difficult to identify her own needs (as is necessary in
the mediation process).87
5) In addition, as Rogers states:
Feminist scholars have long recognized that because of the female experience in our
society, women may perceive situations of inequality as intimating violence where it may
seem an unlikely consequence to a male perceiver. A study of mediation participants in
South Australia showed that female victims tended to be frightened by the presence of
their offender, and even female victims of property damage feared retaliation by
offenders. Another study of participants in divorce mediation showed that 44% of the
reasons given by women who rejected mediation services offered to them centered
88
around their mistrust of, fear of, or desire to avoid their ex-spouse.

In view of all of the above, the assertion is that in a situation where there
is such a disparity of power and in view of the psychological-emotional state
of the wife (and as a result of it), the wife is not capable of negotiating in a
mediation process,89 and even if she does so, the quality of the settlement
arrived at is pre-determined.
This reason for opposition may be summarized by stating that mediation
and the existence of a relationship characterized by violence are mutually
exclusive.90 While the mediation process relies upon the basic assumption
that the parties have relatively equal bargaining power, in divorce cases
involving violence, the point of departure is precisely the opposite. Here,
there is a presumption of a disparity of power and lack of balance between
the parties. The assertion is that this substantive contradiction will of
necessity sabotage the success of the mediation process.91

87. Bryan, supra note 65, at 1221; see also Thompson, supra note 10, at 617.
88. Rogers, supra note 36, at 366–67.
89. Loomis, supra note 2, at 359. See also, Bryan, supra note 66, at 1222 (“Many abused
wives are also averse to risk, feel guilty about fracturing the family, suffer low self-esteem and
depression, have low expectations, feel terror, have difficulty concentrating, and are frequently
passive. Each of these characteristics severely compromises a person’s ability to negotiate
effectively.”) (emphasis added).
90. Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The Further Endangerment of Battered Women and
Children in Custody Mediation, MEDIATION Q. 317, 320 (1990).
91. Thompson, supra note 10, at 617.
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iii. The Mediator’s Limitations
Various scholars throughout the world, as well as people working in the
field (such as attorneys who represent women who have been victims of
violence in divorce cases in the courts), raise concerns regarding the quality
of the handling of such cases that can be provided by mediation.92 These
concerns are raised both with respect to the various mediation programs
(under the auspices of the courts as well as community or other kinds of
mediation) and with respect to the mediator himself. The doubts relate to
the very ability of the programs as well as the mediator to identify and
screen cases involving violence and to handle them appropriately. One of
the assertions is that mediation programs often operate under time pressures
and deal with a heavy caseload. Community mediation programs are based,
for the most part, on the work of volunteer mediators who have received
only minimal training. These conditions make the handling of divorce
disputes involving violence nearly impossible, and in any case certainly
inappropriate, therefore carrying with them the potential for disastrous
results.93 The mediator himself is even likely to fail to identify the extent of
the violent party’s influence on the victim during the mediation itself, right
under the nose of the mediator. Often a violent husband has the ability to
control his wife with a word, a movement or a hint of a movement, noticed
or understood only by himself and his wife (like a code or hidden threat of
violence).94 The wife may then easily agree to terms that will put her and
her children’s lives in danger, simply in order to get out of the room.95 It
must be remembered that violence is the name of the game.
Up to this point, we have presented the assertions regarding the
limitations of the mediator, stemming from a lack of knowledge, time, and
professional experience and skills. However, there is another central
limitation, touching on the very essence of his position––neutrality.
One of the basic principles of the mediation process, which allows the
mediator to carry out his role successfully, is his duty of neutrality.96 The
mediator must serve as a neutral and independent third party, who does not

92. Pearson, supra note 63, at 320.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Laurel Wheeler, Mandatory Family Mediation and Domestic Violence, 26 S. Ill. U. L.J.
559, 572 (2002).
96. Karen A. Zerhusen, Reflection on the Role of the Neutral Lawyer: The Lawyer as
Mediator, 81 KY. L.J. 1165, 1169 (1993) (noting that “[i]mpartiality is key to the mediator’s role”).
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take a position in favor of either party, does not express identification with
any party, and does not deal with blaming one party or the other. The
mediator does not “represent” any party in the mediation process but rather
acts as a neutral third party.97 This neutrality is a central and important
characteristic of the mediator’s role and one of the central keys for his
success in the process. It builds the trust between the parties and the
mediator, and as a result, the parties’ reveal their real interests, desires and
weaknesses. The assertion is that the mediator cannot remain neutral, on
one hand, and on the other hand appropriately handle a divorce dispute in
which violence is a factor!98 If he intervenes on behalf of the victim, he will
breach his duty of neutrality (at least in the eyes of the violent side).
However, when he remains neutral, he contributes to the continued disparity
of power and the violence towards the victim.99 Therefore, there are those
who assert that since it is not in the mediator’s authority to act as a balance
between the powers and as a factor stabilizing the inequality so as to benefit
the victim-wife, it is preferable for her to opt for a judicial process, in which
the judge is better placed to act to protect her interests.100
iv. Additional Reasons for Objection
Additional reasons for objection to the use of mediation in divorce cases
involving domestic violence cited in the scholarly literature with less
frequency are that it “preserves the power paradigm,” “it cheapens and
distorts the phenomenon of domestic violence,” “it creates a clash between
concepts,” and “the feminist argument.”
The argument that mediation “preserves the power paradigm” argues
that when there is an element of violence and control in the relationship
between the parties, a process like mediation only reinforces the mode of
behavior of manipulator and manipulated and essentially creates the optimal

97. Roger Crouch, Divorce Mediation and Legal Ethics, 16 FAM. L.Q. 219, 223–24 (1982).
98. Id. at 362–63 (“The role of the mediator is to remain neutral and refrain from placing
blame on either party. This creates problems when mediation is used to resolve cases that include
domestic violence. The problems arise because it is psychologically essential that victims understand
that they are not responsible for the abuse. Because of the nature of mediation, this places the
mediator in a difficult position because the mediator must not condemn either side in order to ensure
fairness”). See also Thompson, supra note 10, at 617–18; Landrum, supra note 10, at 438 .
99. Landrum, supra note 10, at 441. “If a mediator is truly going to balance the bargaining
power differential, the mediator may have to compromise her neutrality, at least in the eyes of the
batterer. It is quite difficult to remain neutral when the mediator has to work to protect the rights of
one of the parties. And if the mediator attempts to ignore or fails to give credence to the allegations
of abuse, the victim may feel that the mediator is on the abuser’s side, destroying the victim’s belief
that the mediator is neutral.” Id.
100. Loomis, supra note 2, at 368.

110

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss1/4

20

Lavi: Divorce Involving Domestic Violence: Is Med-Arb Likely to be the

[Vol. 14: 91, 2014]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

conditions for the manipulator to continue to control with even greater
force.101 It is precisely mediation, a volitional process throughout, that is
likely to contribute to preserving the pattern of perpetrator-victim, by
granting a platform to the party using force. Because he is a professional
manipulator and has many masks (as is generally the case), the violent party
is likely to turn out to be an excellent “player-controller.” One of the
common ways by which the violent party succeeds in ‘controlling’ the
mediator is that the violent party is the one who participates the best in the
mediation process. The victim usually is not prepared to speak openly, to
share child custody, and to compromise regarding visits or provision of
information. The violent party, on the other hand, is prepared to share child
custody, as well as to discuss the various options of visits, even if this is
solely in order for him to continue his contact with his wife, or in other
words, to continue to manipulate and instill fear in his wife. Simultaneously,
his willingness to compromise and to discuss the various options makes him
look like the preferable candidate to get custody of the children.102
Therefore, not only is the strong party the dominant one, trying to impose his
opinion on the weaker party, he even succeeds in recruiting the mediator to
his side! In other words, he uses the mediation process and the mediator to
make a determination regarding the relation of powers for his benefit––the
benefit of the violent party.103
The reason of “cheapening and distorting the phenomenon of domestic
violence” raises the concern that dealing with family conflict involving
violence in the mediation process will encourage relating in a forgiving
manner (even if only for the sake of appearances) to the serious phenomenon
of domestic violence. In other words, the concern is that the phenomenon
will be made to appear less serious. A mediation-compromise approach,
according to this argument, does not impose the full weight of responsibility
and liability on the violent party, because mediation by its very nature
refrains from making a judgment regarding either party or from assigning
blame.
101. Utzig, supra note 59, at 57.
102. Wheeler, supra note 95, at 570. This argument is closely connected to the third reason for
opposition of “The Mediator’s Limitations” discussed above. See also Thompson, supra note 10, at
618.
103. Loomis, supra note 2, at 356. “Due to the nature of domestic violence, a man enjoys
significant control over a woman, which provides him with advantages in a mediation session. In the
end, the wrong party is punished. Batterers walk away with little or no repercussions from the crime
they commit, while the victims essentially bargain away their safety as well as other important issues
within the mediation, such as custody, visitation, or support.” Id.
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Additionally, mediation is even likely to contribute to a distorted
perspective regarding the phenomenon of domestic violence: The
phenomenon of domestic violence is not caused due to conflict of any kind
between the husband and the wife. Focusing on the conflict as the “source”
of the problem (as mediation does), creates a mistaken representation for
which wife is also responsible (to some extent) for the abuse.104 In addition,
the critics make the point that the failure to impose legal sanctions on a
batterer conveys a message to society that domestic violence is merely a
private matter and not a crime.105 There is no excuse for coming to terms
with anything that will contribute to cheapening or distorting the
phenomenon of domestic violence, and certainly this cannot be accepted
with respect to a process such as mediation, that presumes to educate the
entire society106 through the introduction of more correct patterns of thought.
A further reason for opposition is “the clash between concepts.” The
autonomy of free will (of the parties to mediation) is one of the fundamental
principles of the mediation process.107 “Violence,” on the other hand, as it is
broadly defined, includes any act that causes the victim to do something that
she does not want to do, or to refrain from doing something that she wants to
do, or causes her to be subject to scare tactics and threats.108 In other words,
the negating of free will. We have here two conflicting concepts.
Therefore, these two concepts (violence and mediation) are mutually
contradictory and cannot co-exist. When the nature of the relationship
between the parties raises questions regarding the genuineness of the free
will of each of the parties (with respect to their very participation in the
process or any other substantive decision that has to be made in the course of
104. Id. at 363–64. See also Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the Neighborhood Justice Center: Why
Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Mediated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855, 866 (1985).
105. Holly Joyce, Comment, Mediation and Domestic Violence: Legislative Responses, 14 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 447, 453 (1997).
106. See, p. xii in the preface to Robert A. A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, THE PROMISE
OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994).
It must be remembered that one of the primary objectives of mediation is its use as a tool for social
change, through, among other things, the education of individuals (the parties to the dispute) who go
through the process. In the opinion of Bush & Folger, mediation is likely to contribute to changing
the face of the entire society through changing the manner in which people approach a solution to
conflicts and disputes in everyday life. Mediation is likely to develop integration between
individuals, as well as developing a social conscience, and it is likely to provide tools and skills for
the entire society through developing awareness and concern for justice, empathy, communication
and social interaction. See also, John Lande, Mediation Paradigms and Professional Identities,
MEDIATION Q. 19 (1984) (describing the mediation process as providing the parties with a system of
positive values regarding the appropriate manner of dealing with others).
107. The “party autonomy” or “self determination.” The principle of the parties’ autonomy is
constantly repeated, either directly or indirectly in the various definitions of the process in codes
throughout the world and in the existing literature in the field.
108. Utzig, supra note 59, at 53–54. See also Loomis, supra note 2, at 355.
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it) this is predictive of failure of the process and ineffectiveness of the
settlement arrived at through it.109
A further reason for opposition is “the feminist argument.” Feminism
contributed to the fact that domestic violence was removed from the private
sphere, became the subject of legislation, and entered into public discourse.
It also helped mold the way it is dealt with, including by the courts.110 “The
private is public” is the central argument of second wave feminism.111 The
feminist demand is, therefore, to turn the “private” into the “public” and to
expose “private” oppression to public criticism in order to expand the scope
of social and legal protection of women.112 According to this approach, the
state must be pro-active and must use its power in a positive manner in order
to eliminate the existing power gaps within the family as well. Therefore,
feminism rejects the theories of “the private family.” Quite the opposite, it

109. Zaidel, supra note 52 at 65. See also, Loomis, supra note 2, at 364. A further expression
may be pointed to regarding a further clash between the concepts. The mediation concept speaks of
two parties with relatively equal power, or powers that can be balanced. When dealing with a
relationship involving chronic violence, the concept is that of controller-controlled, with a total
imbalance of power (generally through physical, psychological, and mental control of the victim). It
would be illogical to assume that once a victim avails themselves to mediation, the victim can leave
behind years of internalizing their inequality, suddenly adopt the values of mediation, and
independently handle negotiations on an equal footing as an individual with equal rights. See
Loomis, supra note 2, at 364. A further mediation concept is the existence of trust between the
parties and the mediator. This assumption is baseless in most cases where dealing with divorce
involves domestic violence. In such cases, the mediator will often encounter difficulty in developing
trust in the abusive party. The issue of trust also involves the victim. Often the victim finds it
difficult to develop trust in the mediator. Many victims of domestic violence have been ignored by
their surroundings and they have experienced much disappointment from the public justice system
and from public institutions in general. The mediator, in the eyes of the victim, is perceived as part
of these institutions. In such a case, there will be no trust, which is a fundamental part of mediation.
110. Pearson, supra note 62, at 320.
111. See Orit Kamir, BROADCAST UNIV., Feminism, Rights and Law in Israel (2002), 46
[Hebrew]. In traditional patriarchal society there is a conceptual difference (supported by political
and legal means) between a person’s privacy and the public realm. The essence of this difference is
that in the private realm a person is entitled to do as he wishes without the state or society being
entitled to intervene. In patriarchal societies, women are perceived as belonging to the private realm.
According to feminist assertions many of the patterns of thought and behavior of these traditional
societies are built into our society to this day. Feminist ideology asserts that under the guise of this
distinction between the private and the public realms, the state, through its stance of nonintervention, supports negative phenomena, which happen within the private realm, behind closed
doors. In other words, this distinction between private and public realms serves to cover up the fact
that within the private realm women suffer from oppression and violence on the part of men
(including domestic violence) and the entire society, including the state authorities, refrain from
protecting them.
112. Id. See also Steegh, supra note 5, at 180–81 .
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openly calls for state involvement in the family and the application of justice
to the private realm as well.113
Mediation, to a great extent, does the opposite. In other words, it
transforms what is “public” into the “private.” It may be said that the justice
spoken of in the mediation process is individual justice. In other words, as
distinguished from the judicial process, in which the results are determined
according to the application of the law—legal norms of a general objective
nature based upon principles considered important by those determining
such norms—in the mediation process, the settlement agreement between
the parties is fashioned according to individual norms, chosen by the parties,
which are consistent with their personal feeling of justice (e.g., accepted
custom, the rules of the market, ethical rules, religious law, etc.). This often
happens as a result of the parties intentionally ignoring the general law (of
course, where the law is dispositive and not cognitive). Here the feminist
argument comes into play. According to the feminist argument, there are
certain issues, such as family disputes on a background of violence, when it
is not acceptable to permit the individual sense of justice of the parties to
determine how they will end. The feminists did not struggle to transfer such
issues from the private to the public realm and to enact general objective
norms regarding them only to have such norms ignored and to return these
issues to the private realm or to the realm of the individual sense of justice of
any particular person.114 The opposition to mediation based on this reason
argues that it is unacceptable to allow the violent party to be protected from
public scrutiny and legal sanctions. There is the additional concern that by
virtue of transferring the handling of the subject of domestic violence from
the court to the privacy of the mediation process, new legal precedents will
not be established.115 However, one of the answers to this concern is that the
mediation process does not render the criminal justice system obsolete. If a
victim of violence so desires, she may file a claim, request a protective order
and still choose the mediation process.116
(b) The Proponents’ Position
Those who support mediation in divorce cases involving violence assert
that the mediation process should not be automatically ruled out for every
113. Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV.. 1497, 1501 (1983).
114. A fortiori when such person is the violent party. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 180.
115. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 181.
116. Regarding the feminist assertion of proponents of mediation in divorce cases involving
domestic violence. See infra, “V: ‘Giving a Voice’ and Empowering the Woman – the Feminist
Argument.”
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divorce case in which there is some kind of domestic violence. Cases
involving extreme levels of violence will indeed not be suitable for
mediation,117 but in general the mediation process does have advantages over
the judicial process even in divorce cases involving violence.
i.

Elimination of the Component of Danger

Proponents of the use of mediation in divorce cases involving violence
argue that “litigation is also dangerous.”118 In effect, this proposal centers
on the argument that there is relatively greater security provided by the
judicial system when compared to the mediation process. Proponents say
that this proposition is fundamentally erroneous.119 Pearson, for example,
notes that notwithstanding the fact that legal intervention is the option
preferred by lawyers, many lawyers admit that in many cases domestic
violence remains hidden from them in divorce cases that they handle and
therefore, the danger is identical in the judicial and the mediation process.120
Moreover, there are those who assert that the judicial process is even
more dangerous than mediation. In the judicial process in general,
particularly in the legal pleadings, the parties (under the influence of their
attorneys) usually take extreme positions with the objective of portraying the
opposing party in the most negative light possible. This is likely to escalate
the danger when the violent husband discovers that a complaint of violence
has been filed against him or when he is served with a complaint including
allegations that he used violence.121 The argument is that the judicial
process contributes to the escalation of the conflict between the parties and
enhances the danger awaiting the wife from the violent husband.122 In the
field, there is increasing evidence showing that the use of legal sanctions
117. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 622. This is the accepted position among most of the
proponents of mediation in divorce cases involving domestic violence. Id.
118. Thompson, supra note 10, at 620. See also Alexandria Zylstra, Mediation and Domestic
Violence: A Practical Screening Method for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators,
2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 253, 259 (2001) (arguing that critics of mediation err in “comparing the best
possible litigation scenario (where truth is found and justice served) to the worst possible mediation
scenario for cases involving domestic violence (joint sessions with an untrained mediator”).
119. Lauri Boxer-Macomber, Revisiting the Impact of California’s Mandatory Custody
Mediation Program on Victims of Domestic Violence Through a Feminist Positionality Lens, 15 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 883, 896 (2003). Quite the opposite, the assertion is that the mediation process is
safer. Id.
120. Pearson, supra note 62, at 331.
121. Utzig, supra note 58, at 58.
122. Id.
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does not prevent the continued use of violence. Quite the contrary, in certain
cases, criminal charges were identified as increasing the chance that the
violence would recur and continue.123 The argument is that the judicial
system, in effect, encourages the husband to deny his abusive behavior
because his lawyer will assist him in denying the crime.124 In mediation, on
the other hand, the privacy of the process and the neutrality of the mediator
increase the probability that the violent party will abandon his methods and
will agree to accept help. Since the neutral role of the mediator does not
require him to be a judge who makes determinations regarding past events,
he can focus upon the future and measures to remove any possibility of
future violence. The argument of the proponents of mediation is that for this
reason some of the violent parties are likely to react in a more constructive
manner when they feel that they are being listened to, they are being dealt
with fairly, and the expectations regarding their future behavior are being
developed.125 Researchers Ellis and Stuckless report that volitional multisession mediation is more effective in preventing future violence than
lawyer negotiations.126
In the same vein,
While there is substantial concern that pursuing restorative justice would jeopardize a
victim’s future safety, because the offender will not be incarcerated, a particular
restorative justice outcome might require the offender to experience psychological care,
or other remedies that might diminish this concern, including productive community
127
involvement.
Of course, there must be special safeguards and screening techniques to
make sure that such a process does not further jeopardize a victim’s safety.

Supporters of mediation argue that in comparison to the judicial process,
mediation limits the component of danger and is likely to make a greater
contribution to preventing violence by the former spouse.128

123.
124.
125.
126.

Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 181.
Id.
Id. at 181–82.
DESMOND ELLIS & NOREEN STUCKLESS, MEDIATING AND NEGOTIATING MARITAL
CONFLICTS 61–62 (1996).
127. Rogers, supra note 35, at 368.
128. Pearson, supra note 63, at 331. “Overall, the investigators conclude that, compared to
lawyer negotiations, mediation makes a greater contribution toward preventing the abuse of
separated women by their ex-partners.” Id.
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ii. The Mediator’s Skills
As opposed to those that argue of “the mediator’s limitations” in dealing
with situations of family disputes involving violence, as discussed above,129
those supporting mediation argue that “there is no guarantee that judges or
attorneys are more educated about domestic violence than mediators.”130
Indeed, quite the opposite, the judicial system often fails victims by using
their reactions to violence, such as frequent moves to escape a batterer or
demonstrating what appears to be an uncooperative attitude, against them.131
Similarly, proponents of mediation argue that parties with greater
resources may have access to representation unaffordable by the other party,
thus introducing disparities in bargaining power into the judicial process as
well.132
Those supporting mediation propose the mediator’s skills, acquired
through specific training, are an answer to the assertions regarding his
limitations.133 In other words, the assertion is that proper training of
mediators is likely to resolve many of the reservations expressed by the
opponents to mediation in divorce cases involving domestic violence. For
example, the reasons for opposition cited above regarding the power
disparity between the parties or the limitations of the mediator134 are likely,
at least in some cases, to be mitigated if the mediator is appropriately and
skilled to cope with such disputes. The mediator’s skills and training are
likely to assist him in identifying at the outset a component of violence in
the relationship, and in ferreting out information likely to assist him in
dealing appropriately with the problem within the mediation process. For
example, the mediator is likely to reduce the disparity of power between the
parties without infringing upon his duty of neutrality, by using questions to
examine and confirm the suspicions of the weaker party. In addition,
holding separate meetings (caucuses) with each party allows the mediator to
receive direct feedback regarding issues of disparity of power and feelings of
129. Pearson, see supra note 63, at “iii. The Mediator’s Limitations.”
130. Thompson, supra note 10, at 620–21.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 40, at 264. See also Pearson, supra note
62, at 324. Contra Bryan, supra note 66, at 1224–25 (stating, “Many mediators who claim
knowledge about and sensitivity to domestic violence suffer from the same misperceptions of
battered woman as judges, lawyers and mental health professionals.”).
134. See supra, notes 73–101 and accompanying text.
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security.135 Additional tools at the disposal of the properly trained mediator
include taking additional cautionary measures, such as receiving
independent legal advice and to some extent an explanation of the laws, as
well as concluding the mediation in favor of the weaker party, when this is
necessary to protect her interests and no other alternative exists.
Indeed, training programs for mediators regarding divorce cases
involving domestic violence are gaining popularity throughout the world.136
The recommendation is for training that will also include information and
advice regarding the means to ensure the process itself and the security of
those participating in it (both at the time the process is being carried out and
at its conclusion), as well as with respect to the option of involving external
entities likely to contribute to a successful mediation.137 The training is
supposed to assist the mediator in understanding the dynamics of the
violence in the family, learning unique techniques for dealing with such
families, and dealing with the inequality of powers, means of disclosure,
means of caution, constructing a safe program, and dealing with the attitude
of the community to the subject. This guidance must be accompanied by
requirements for a certain amount of experience in mediation under
supervision.138
The Model Standards of Practice for Divorce and Family Mediators
provides that a mediator must have knowledge of family law and the
psychological impact of a family crisis on the parents and the children. In
addition to special training in the mediation process itself, mediators must
also undergo training and education in the field of domestic violence and the
subject of child abuse and neglect.139

135. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 186–87.
136. Pearson, supra note 62, at 324 (noting that according to reports from centers that provide
training programs for mediators, seventy percent report that their mediators participate in
interdisciplinary professional forums and training sessions dealing with domestic violence.)
137. Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 40, at 265. If safety concerns emerge from the
mediation process, particularly in post-dispositional cases, the mediator must have an immediate
plan of action ready to assess the problem and must be ready to refer the case to the appropriate
agency in order to diminish the harm to the parties or their children.” Id.
138. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 190.
139. MODEL STANDARDS FOR FAMILY AND MEDIATION (1984). The Tenth and Eleventh
Standards provide that a family mediator “must be familiar with” family situations involving child
abuse or domestic violence. In cases of child abuse or neglect, the Tenth Standard requires the
mediator to report the abuse to the appropriate authorities. In contrast, in cases of violence against a
spouse, the mediator is required only to fashion the mediation process accordingly and there is no
obligation to terminate the mediation proceeding. Both the Tenth and the Eleventh Standards
require the mediator to be aware of the symptoms and dynamics of both forms of abuse and he is
forbidden from continuing with the mediation if he does not have appropriate training. The Model
Standards recommends broad training so that the mediator is able to discern that a particular family
situation involves child abuse or neglect and to report this to the authorities and to fashion the
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Empirical studies have given merit to the assumption of proponents of
mediation that victims of violence are able to carry out negotiations
efficiently instead of from a position of inferiority that is a result of power
inequality between the parties engaged in mediation. These positive findings
are attributed to the skills of the mediator regarding the mediator’s ability to
identify, screen, and gage the component of violence at the outset as well as
appropriately deal with the problem of the power disparities and any other
difficulties that such situation creates.140
iii. Screening and Adopting Appropriate Coping Strategies
Proponents of mediation in divorce cases involving violence assert that
not all divorce cases involving violence are alike and that there are certainly
many such cases that are can be dealt with appropriately through
mediation.141 The proponents of mediation object to the sweeping
generalization that any dispute between a separated couple that involves
violence is unsuited for mediation. According to these proponents,
screening at the outset should be preferable to exclusion from the outset.142
As a result of screening, disputes that are not appropriate for mediation will
be removed from the agenda of the process (and the parties will be referred
for different treatment), whereas those cases appropriate for mediation can
receive appropriate treatment within the mediation process, from a wide
spectrum of means of dealing with this issue, when the element of violence
has been picked up in the preliminary screening.143 The preliminary
screening is meant to identify disputes that are not at all suitable for
mediation! These include disputes in which the victim’s consent is not
genuine, but given only in order to mollify the abuser.144
mediation process in accordance with such a situation. For a more expansive discussion, see
Wheeler, supra note 96, at 568.
140. Ellis & Stuckless, supra note 126, at 80; Joyce, supra note 105, at 457.
141. Landrum, supra note 10, at 435–36.
142. Id. at 437. See also Maxwell, supra note 5, at 337. “Some proponents of mediation argue
that mediation is appropriate in cases involving domestic violence if the type of domestic violence is
taken into account and mechanisms to ensure a safe and fair settlement for the victim are provided.”
For a more expansive treatment, see Maxwell, supra note 5, at 345.
143. See also Utzig, supra note 58, at 337. Regarding the various methods of dealing with the
issue, including screening that continues into the mediation process, and decision-making by the
victim, see Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 198–202.
144. See Utzig, supra note 58, at 60–63. The abuser shows contempt for the victim’s words,
feelings, desires and acts and refuses to recognize her worth even after the mediator speaks with him
regarding the effect his behavior has on the victim. The abuse (in any of its forms) continues in the
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A number of possible means of dealing with violence within the
mediation process (to the extent that an element of violence has been
identified during the screening but the case was not disqualified from being
handled in mediation), are enumerated in the literature: the use of separate
legal advice for each party (with the attorney for the victim being someone
who has expertise in both the mediation process and the subject of domestic
violence);145 the participation of additional experts in the process (including
professionals and therapists);146 screening that accompanies the entire
mediation process;147 frequent use of caucusing (with the content remaining
confidential from the other party);148 the presence of armed guards during all
of the mediation sessions alongside the accompaniment of a security guard
to the parking area; the use of co-mediators (two mediators, one male and
one female); the use of separate waiting areas and separate entrances for
men and women; stopping the process when necessary; and, referring the
victim to appropriate shelters or to programs for advice and assistance that
specialize in domestic violence, when problems of security arise. The
mediator always has the option to receive assistance from the court through
referral of the parties for emergency interrogation or through evaluation of
the case and its legal aspects.149
Additionally, knowledgeable mediators and mediation program administrators may also
introduce both victims and abusers to other community and professional resources
available to them. For example, some mediation proponents believe that the mediation
process, because of its privacy and the role of the neutral mediator, actually encourages
150
the abuser to admit his actions and seek help. Mediators can educate participants about
a variety of options that may be available, including: batterers’ treatment and anger
management programs; alcohol and drug treatment; dual-diagnosis consultants and

course of the mediation meetings and the violent husband refuses to respect the safety boundaries
that were determined in advance. The parties (or one of them) insist on carrying weapons; the
parties (or one of them) are under the influence of drugs or alcohol; one of the parties breaches the
rules that were determined in advance for the process and refuses to recognize that this breach
constitutes a problem. Such disputes are categorized, even by proponents of mediation, as
permanently disqualified for the mediation process. Among the existing means of screening are
screening through the use of questionnaires, screening through the use of caucusing, screening
through non-verbal hints, etc. See Utzig, supra note 58, at 60–63. For further discussion, see also
Jeske, supra note 1, at 694–95.
145. See Maxwell, supra note 5, at 346. The idea is that the victim can receive advice and legal
defense to the extent that she needs them.
146. See Utzig, supra note 59, at 65. The experts are likely to meet with each party separately.
Id.
147. Loretta M. Frederick, Questions About Family Court Domestic Violence Screening and
Assessment, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 523, 526 (2008) (arguing that the mediator should think of screening
not as a one-time process, but rather as an ongoing need).
148. Loomis, supra note 2, at 365.
149. Pearson, supra note 63, at 326–27.
150. Landrum, supra note 10, at 462–63.
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treatment; victim support and treatment; posttraumatic stress groups; therapy; .†.†.
supervised access and exchange facilities; reunification therapists; parenting
coordination; assistance in implementing court-ordered parenting plans; treatment for
traumatized children; parenting without violence classes; parenting education, skills
training, and coaching; custody evaluation; child protection services; protective orders;
removal of weapons; criminal penalties; court orders with triggers; suspended or
supervised visitation; case management; interpreter services; housing and employment
assistance; immigration services; establishing child support and paternity; child care; and
151
advocacy.

iv. Efficiency
The fact that the mediation process is less expensive and quicker than
litigation152 has additional value in divorce cases involving violence, and this
is a significant advantage a victim of domestic violence, who is naturally
interested in concluding the dispute as quickly as possible (and at minimal
financial cost).153
v. “Giving a Voice” and Empowerment of the Woman—the Feminist
Argument
The mediation process, which is less adversarial than court proceedings, is characterized
as more potentially empowering to the battered woman than the formality of the
154
courtroom setting.

Current critical feminist insights regarding the law assert, as mentioned
above,155 that the judicial process does not faithfully fulfill its function of
“giving women a voice” and therefore, a better alternative for dispute
resolution is necessary. In comparison to the legal process, which is geared
towards the competition and struggle identified with the male style, the
mediation process is perceived as the “home court” of women. One of the
advantages attributed to mediation from the feminist perspective is
empowerment of the woman who participates in mediation, in view of the
opportunity it gives her to express herself and to address the emotional
aspects of the dispute (because women tend to speak about feelings with
151. Id.
152. See Utzig, supra note 59, at 58. See also Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 40, at 261
(“[M]ediation offers an alternative that is quicker and less expensive than the traditional adversarial
method.”).
153. Particularly if she is a victim of financial abuse.
154. Jeske, supra note 1, at 686.
155. See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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greater ease). One must remember that one of the elements that a battered
woman needs, perhaps more than anything else, is a voice. By giving her a
voice, the mediation process may return to the battered woman the power
taken from her in the destructive relationship and restore in her the
confidence that comes from controlling her own life. A process that
provides her with a platform for expressing her feelings, fears and desires, a
process that listens to her description of the situation and her perception of
matters through her prism contributes to the empowerment of the victim. 156
Moreover, the very ability to choose the process for dealing with her
affairs is likely to contribute to the empowerment of the victim, thereby
helping her to progress beyond the position of the “victim” by enabling her
to have “more of a voice in what happens to her future.”157 As Sandra Zaher
explains, “mediation can empower the powerless by enabling them to speak
in their own voice and assert their own interests, perhaps for the first
time.”158 John Haynes, the founding president of the Academy of Family
Mediators, has argued that mediation can encourage both the victim and the
abuser “to focus .†.†. on where they are going in their lives as separate,
whole, independent people.”159
Indeed, in the field as well, women who went through mediation for
divorce disputes report that the mediation enabled them to voice their
concerns and to express their point of view. Studies demonstrate that these
women feel that they had an equal amount of influence on fashioning the
terms of the settlement agreement at the conclusion of the mediation
process. Battered women note that the mediation empowered them,
enabling them to stand up for themselves and to take responsibility for their
decisions, actions and future, to present their position and to solve their
problems.160 One study shows that only 15% of battered women left the
mediation process before its conclusion.161 In a process that places the
parties at the center and which emphasizes the “empowerment”162 of the
parties, it is not surprising that women feel this “empowerment” more
156. Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 40, at 256 (“Several commentators, however, have
argued that mediation is a vehicle for empowerment and an appropriate mode of intervention even
when domestic violence has occurred.”). See also id. at 266-67 (“Well-trained mediators can and
frequently do develop processes and establish guidelines that empower and enlighten the victims in
domestic disputes.”) (emphasis added).
157. Landrum, supra note 10, at 445.
158. Id. at 447.
159. Id. at 447.
160. Thompson, supra note 10, at 622.
161. Id.
162. Bush & Folger, supra note 107, at 85 (defining “empowerment” as “the restoration to
individuals of a sense of their own value and strength and their own capacity to handle life’s
problems.”).
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strongly.163 Victims of violence are particularly likely to benefit from this
empowerment, which constitutes part of the process of healing from the
crisis that they went through.164 An attorney who works in the field of
family law aptly summarizes this point:
Well-trained mediators can and frequently do develop processes and establish guidelines
that empower and enlighten the victims in domestic disputes. Such mediators balance
power and ensure that a safe and supportive environment is established .†.†. These types
of mediators are much more likely to validate the parties’ feelings and perceptions and
they provide a better balance of power among the parties than any courtroom process
165
that I have observed in my fifteen years of clinical practice.

C. The problems of the current situation
Two central problems are raised both by the scholarly discourse and the
existing practice with respect to divorce cases involving violence. In this
section we will deal with each of them and in Chapter 5 we will propose
med-arb as an answer to both of these problems.
(a) “Practical Problems”
Scholars have proposed the adoption of mediation as a process for
dealing with divorce cases involving violence was raised in the scholarly
literature166 in view of the disappointment in the ability of the judicial
163. Ryna Bogoch, Ruth Halperin Kaddari & Yael Ronen, Gender, Mediation and Divorce
Proceedings, 7 HAMISHPAT 335, 350 (2002). Indeed, women report a greater sense of security in
dealing with their ex-husband following mediation than following legal proceedings, and more so
than that felt by men who participated in mediation. On the other hand, there are those who believe
that it is legal proceedings that are more empowering than mediation. While the mediator views his
clients as people dealing with a problem and therefore in need of assistance, in the view of the
lawyer, the client has rights and he is to be served and his demands are to be fulfilled. As against the
findings to the effect that women feel more empowered in the mediation process, the assertion is
raised that in any event such empowerment is only in the short term, since the mediation is focused
and too short-lived to have a long-term effect. See Janet Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist
Perspective: Promise and Problems, LAW AND INEQUALITY 21, 22 (1984) (“Finally, critics claim
that mediation is detrimental to the interests of women, who, being less empowered, need both the
formal legal system and aggressive legal representation to protect existing rights and pursue new
legal safeguards.”); see also Grillo, supra note 59, at 1550 (explaining that the mediation process
does not give proper expression to the “woman’s voice,” but rather depresses and silences it, thereby
disappointing women and not serving as the feminist answer that is so badly needed).
164. Especially if the violence also included rape. See Rogers, supra note 36, at 357
(“Regaining self-control is an important step in the recovery of rape victims.”).
165. Knowlton & Muhlhauser, supra note 40, at 266–67.
166. See supra notes 16–26 and accompanying text.
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process to deal with divorce cases in general, and particularly with those
involving violence. However, we cannot ignore the fact that adopting the
mediation process to deal with these cases is not free of doubts and creates
new problems, which cannot be completely resolved through use of the
solutions suggested by its proponents.
One of the solutions proposed by the proponents of mediation to deal
with the problems created by the use of mediation in divorce cases involving
violence is screening.167 However, this solution is far from perfect and may
frequently result in disappointment. Firstly, the findings point to the fact
that only about 80% of mediation programs formerly attempt to identify
violence and only about half of such programs conduct personal interviews
in addition to filling out questionnaires.168 Secondly, Thompson notes:
[S]creening mechanisms are frequently inaccurate. Many such mechanisms place the
burden to screen on judges, but typically cases are sent to mediation before judicial
intervention occurs. Further, most screening mechanisms require one of the parties to
disclose the abuse, but batterers have no incentive to disclose abuse that they perpetrate.
The burden of disclosure falls on the victim, who may be reluctant to disclose the abuse
169
for the same reasons she is reluctant to seek intervention.

It must be remembered that identifying violence is more a case of
artistry than of information because the judgment of the evaluators is an
important factor,170 and therefore, some mediators are of the opinion that
screening cannot achieve precise outcomes. In effect, the studies show that
as few “as five percent of mediation cases are excluded because of domestic
violence.”171
Additionally, Greenberg notes:
There is no foolproof screening for domestic violence.†.†. Screenings, such as those
designed by Tolman, Ellis and Girdner have limited efficacy. Different domestic
violence screenings are designed for specific types of violence, excluding the
identification of others beyond their scope. Most are not calibrated to account for the
172
range of cultural expressions of violence.

Another solution offered by the proponents of mediation for dealing
with its disadvantages is training the mediator and ensuring that he has the
requisite skills to deal with these cases.173 According to their assertion, only
167. See supra iii. Screening and Adopting Appropriate Coping Strategies.
168. Steegh, supra note 5, at 194.
169. Thompson, supra note 10, at 621–22.
170. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 194.
171. Thompson, supra note 10, at 599–600.
172. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 609. See Landrum, supra note 10, at 451 (“[S]creening
programs that focus solely on past physical violence may miss other types of abuse such as verbal
threats and intimidation, psychological abuse, and economic control over the other person.”).
173. See supra, “ii.The Mediator’s Skill.”
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mediation carried out by a skilled and experienced mediator who specializes
in the subject of domestic violence, understands the unique dynamic of such
cases, and uses special techniques to deal with them will be able to address
many of the assertions of the opponents of mediation.174 Indeed, many
mediation programs provide training for mediators to recognize signs of
domestic violence and be able to manage situations where it becomes an
issue. However, in some states there is still no requirement for special
training for mediators. In effect, only 70% of the mediation programs that
were surveyed report that mediators participated in training programs
regarding domestic violence.175
Moreover, the concern is that training the mediator, regardless of how
extensive such training may be, will not enable him to discern all of the
signs of control and exploitation in the couple’s relationship.176 More
importantly, the assertion is that no person can be talented enough so as to
put the victim in a position of equal power opposite the exploitative and
violent party, no matter the degree to which the mediator is attuned to the
dynamics of the relationship. Similarly, although the Model Standards
provide that mediators should undergo training that includes familiarity with
family law and insight about how family issues can affect all members of the
family, “there is no specific description of what appropriate training in
domestic violence issues might entail.”177 The effectiveness of existing
mediator training programs should be studied in order to ascertain how much
training is necessary, at what frequency mediators should be required to
undergo additional training, and the topics that should be included in the
training programs.178 Until such time, according to this assertion, relying on
the mediator’s training and skills is simply insufficient.
Landrum summarized:
Many mediation programs provide training for mediators to recognize signs of domestic
violence and be able to manage situations where it becomes an issue.†.†. . In spite of the
fact .†.†. that legislatures and courts have developed a variety of “solutions,” very few

174. Including,the disparity of power between the parties, the safety problem, etc. See Ver
Steegh, supra note 5, at 187–88.
175. Id. at 189–90.
176. As Landrum notes, “There may be subtle indicators - or sometimes overt signs - that the
abuser is still intimidating the victim to get what he or she wants from the mediation, and if the
mediator is not vigilant he or she will miss those signals.” Landrum, supra note 10, at 440.
177. Landrum, supra note 10, at 455.
178. Id. at 456.
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empirical studies have evaluated the effectiveness of mediation in cases where there is a
179
history of domestic violence.

Holding caucuses is another proposed solution to the problems that
mediation is likely to create in divorce cases involving violence.180
Proponents of mediation assert that holding separate meetings enables the
mediator to bring about a more equal balance of power between the parties.
One reason for this is the mediator’s control of the information (both
information provided to the other party and information that remains
confidential) germane to the process. In addition, Ver Steegh notes that
“[s]eparate caucuses give the mediator a chance to obtain direct feedback on
power and safety issues.”181
Opponents of mediation assert, however, that caucuses do not provide
an effective solution: “There are significant flaws, however, in using
caucuses in mediations involving domestic violence. Most notably, the use
of caucuses assumes that a short discussion with a victim will uncover and
rectify years of being silenced.”182 Additionally, “[a]lthough mediators
claim that they can balance power, perhaps by meeting separately with each
spouse, the extreme power disparities between an abused wife and her
violent husband defy balancing.183 It seems, therefore, that the solution of
caucusing is indeed limited.
A further solution that mediation proponents promoted to address the
difficulty of disparity of power between the parties and the question of the
fairness of the mediation agreement expands the boundaries of the
mediator’s role in divorce cases involving violence and redefines the
mediator’s duty of neutrality. Landrum has analyzed the debate:
Some victims’ advocates take a more extreme stance about the role that the mediator
should play in these mediations, arguing that the mediator should not really be neutral at
all—instead, the mediator should be responsible for ensuring that the victim gets a fair
settlement. One of the problems with this approach is that it puts the mediator in a
difficult position. On the one hand, one can see the obvious benefits of focusing on the
needs of the victim of violence in mediations, but at the same time the mediator no longer
functions as a neutral party.
In addition, one scholar advocates the mediator being the monitor of whether or not the
abuser complies with the agreement afterwards. However, that approach to mediation
would place so many responsibilities on mediators that it might be difficult to find
mediators willing to take on these responsibilities. First, there would be concerns that
such requirements might create a standard of care for mediators that would open them up
to a lawsuit for negligence or mediator malpractice. In addition, having to monitor

179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 428.
See Ver Steegh, supra note 5 and text accompanying note 136.
Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 187.
Loomis, supra note 2, at 365.
Bryan, supra note 66, at 1223.
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whether an abuser is complying with an agreement puts an additional burden on the
mediator and might place the mediator, as well as the victim, in an unsafe position.
Finally, such high expectations of the mediator’s role in the process would put a lot of
stress on the mediators who might worry that they would not perform their role well. As
a result of these potential issues, programs have not usually placed such responsibilities
184
on the mediator, but mediators still struggle with how to remain neutral in this context.

Another solution that has been proposed in the scholarly literature for
dealing with the failures of the mediation process, especially the “danger
component,”185 ‘is online dispute resolution (ODR). ODR is simply any
form of ADR that takes place through use of the internet. Online mediation
enables the parties to be physically separated, unlike traditional mediation
where the physical presence of the parties and mediator is central to the
process.186 Where there is a basis for concern that mediation in the presence
of both parties would jeopardize a victim’s safety, the elimination of the
potential for physical contact through the use of ODR might enable the use
of mediation.187 However, this solution is also not perfect188 and is intended
primarily to deal with the danger component while not resolving the other
disadvantages created by the process.189
The practical problem can be summarized, therefore, by the statement
that with respect to divorce cases involving violence, the mediation process
includes inherent disadvantages, for which complete solutions have not yet
been found by the proponents of mediation.
The med-arb process, as presented in the following chapter,190 is likely
to address and resolve many of these disadvantages.
(b) ‘Conceptual Problems’
The general answer of mediation proponents to the inherent
disadvantages of the process, which cannot be completely resolved (as
enumerated in the previous section)191 is the existence of the option to return
to a judicial proceeding. This answer is insufficient and indeed adds a
conceptual problem to the issues already presented because mediation is
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Landrum, supra note 10, at 441–42.
See supra, “i. The Component of Danger.”
Jeske, supra note 1, at 667–78.
Rogers, supra note 36, at 368.
Id. at 379.
See supra (a) The Opponents’ Position.
See supra Chapter Five.
See supra (a) Practical Problems.
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suggested to victims of domestic violence as a means of avoiding the
judicial process in dealing with their divorce action. How, therefore, can the
judicial process, with all of its disadvantages and limitations (from which the
victims have escaped) be proposed as a remedy for the weaknesses of the
mediation process?!
Moreover, the existing discourse deals only with what is worse than
what, and therein lies its weakness. In other words, with respect to divorce
cases involving violence, many agree that “[n]either the traditional legal
system nor the mediation alternative provides a perfect solution for battered
women.”192 Rather, while proponents of mediation point out the weaknesses
of the judicial process in dealing with the issue, the proponents of the
judicial process point out the disadvantages of mediation. One can ask,
“what if they are both correct?” What if, indeed, both of these processes
have serious disadvantages that cannot be overcome in terms of the manner
that they deal with divorce cases involving violence? Is there no third
solution that is more appropriate? Why limit the discussion to a choice of
either––or (mediation or litigation)? Is this really all we have to offer to
victims of violence—a bad process or one that is even worse? This article
proposes a third course, med-arb.
CHAPTER FIVE: MED-ARB—THE PROPOSED SOLUTION
This article proposes med-arb as a solution for divorce cases involving
violence. We emphasize that the proposal is to adopt med-arb only for those
cases that are appropriate for mediation (i.e., excluding cases involving
serious violence or other circumstances that disqualify the case from going
to mediation,193 and only when the victim is interested in such a process).194
In recent years, various mechanisms have been developed in the
literature and in the field to improve mediation as an alternative tool for

192. Thompson, supra note 10, at 620.
193. See id. at 623 (“[V]ery severe domestic violence cases may also be uniformly
inappropriate for mediation. Nancy Ver Steegh argues that because abuse differs in severity, ‘the
existence of violence creates a red flag for the mediator signaling a need for a closer look at the
victim’s ability to negotiate and the level of the abuser’s denial and control.’ She suggests that a
mediator exploring negotiation ability and levels of denial and control might look to such factors as
use of weapons, the victim’s fear of retribution, the batterer’s failure to take responsibility for his
actions, and the couple’s inability to separate its interests.’”). See also Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at
196.
194. Thompson, supra note 10, at 622–23 (“[M]ediation should never occur against the wishes
of a victim. Mediating a domestic violence case against the wishes of a victim undermines her
ability to protect herself and denies her capacity for self-determination.”). With respect to med-arb,
this article requires the victim’s informed consent. See infra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
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divorce cases involving violence,195 including screening (preliminary and
secondary), training of mediators, using caucuses and tools of ODR, using of
parenting coordination or parenting education, using of separate legal advice
for each of the parties, participation of additional experts in the process
(such as professionals and therapists), including the presence of armed
guards in the course of the mediation sessions, and terminating the process
where necessary, referring the victim to an appropriate shelter or to advice
and assistance programs that specialize in domestic violence. This article
does not propose doing away with these mechanisms or substituting others
for them. Med-arb is proposed only as an addition to what currently exists.
One of the scholars has correctly noted that “[w]e should be using every tool
at our disposal to identify and help victims of domestic violence.”196
We shall now examine the possibility for the implementation of an
additional tool—med-arb.
A. The Substance, Development and Sphere of Application of Med-Arb
Med-arb is a combination of the words “mediation” and “arbitration.” It
is a hybrid, two-stage process for dispute resolution, combining mediation
with arbitration. Classic med-arb is carried out by one neutral mediator,
who was agreed upon by all of the parties, and who, only if the mediation
does not succeed, will then wear the hat of an arbitrator will carry out
arbitration between the parties, rending a binding arbitration award with
respect to all of the issues that were not resolved in the course of the
mediation process.197 The goal of med-arb is to combine the advantages of
mediation and arbitration in one forum. Med-arb attempts to combine the
consensual nature of mediation with the component of “finality of the
judgment” of arbitration. By agreeing to med-arb, the parties express their
prior consent to attempt to arrive at a volitional agreement during the first
stage—mediation—and if this is not successful (or is only partially
successful because some issues continue to be disputed) accept the binding
award of the mediator-arbitrator in the second stage. The two stages of the
process are clearly separated from one another.198 There are those who call
med-arb “mediation with muscle” or “mediation with a bite” since it prevails
195. See supra iii. Screening and Adopting Appropriate Screening Strategies.
196. Jeske, supra note 1, at 671.
197. John Blankenship, Developing your ADR Attitude: Med-Arb, a Template for Adaptive
ADR, 42 TENN. BAR J. 28, 28 (2006) .
198. Id. at 29–30.
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over what is considered, in the opinion of various scholars, to be one of the
central weaknesses of the mediation process: the mediator’s lack of authority
to impose a binding award on the parties.199 The mediator-arbitrator, on the
other hand, is chosen by the parties and their attorneys. He must have
experience in carrying out mediations and arbitrations as well knowledge of
the dispute subject. Clearly, this complex role must be filled by someone the
parties (and their attorneys) trust. Additionally, prior to the beginning of the
process, the mediator-arbitrator must apprise the parties of the risks involved
in the use of the process and have them sign a waiver of the right to replace
the mediator-arbitrator (or disqualify him) and of the right to appeal his
award. The med-arb agreement also includes the basic rules of the process
and details of the issues to be deliberated.
Med-arb originally appeared as a reaction to the need for resolution of
labor disputes through binding arbitration in place of strikes and lock-outs of
factories.200 At the beginning of the 20th century there were two main
methods for a neutral person to make a decision. The first—”the
independent chairman method”—developed in 1911 in a factory in
Chicago.201 The second method—”the arbitrator method”—developed in
1903 in the wake of the protest of coal miners.202 In effect, the theoretical
underpinnings of med-arb can be found somewhere prior to World War II,
and its formal structure was formed in the wake of the bombing of Pearl
Harbor in December 1941.203 The term “med-arb” was coined in 1970. Sam
and John Kagel, the first ones to develop this process, used it for the first

199. Id. at 30. In other words, does not have the “muscle” of the mediator-arbitrator.
200. Id. at 32.
201. See Barry C. Bartel, Med-Arb as Distinct Method of Dispute Resolution: History, Analysis,
and Potential, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661, 669 (1991). The method included “a go-between with
authority” to render a final and binding decision. See id.
202. See id. In the wake of the protest a council was established to deal with workers’ protests
and to arrive at settlements. Where the council did not succeed, the dispute was transferred to a
neutral arbitrator. The arbitration method was essentially legal in its nature, with the council holding
a formal hearing and afterwards transferring all of the evidence to the arbitrator.
203. See id. at 670; Blankenship, supra note 198, at 32. Officials from the Departments of
Labor and Commerce met in order to prepare a recommendation to President Roosevelt regarding a
method that would ensure stability in the industrial work place. The group recommended preventing
strikes by settling disputes through peaceful means. In the wake of its recommendations, President
Roosevelt established the National War Labor Board (NWLB) which was an important step in
developing arbitration in the area of labor disputes. The impression that was created, that the Board
was setting in place binding arbitration, is not precise. Quite the opposite, the council of managers
primarily used a method of mediation, and the arbitration was volitional. The director of the
Institute for Labor Relations and Social Security at New York University at the time declared:
Those who served as arbitrators at the time put a greater emphasis on arriving at a “fair” or “just”
solution than a “legally correct solution.” The arbitrator took upon himself the role of a mediator
and was more of a “friend” of both parties than a “judge.” This arbitration process could be more
accurately termed “med-arb.” Blankenship, supra note 198, at 32.
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time to settle a nurses’ strike in a San Francisco hospital. According to the
Kagels’ model, the parties waived their right to strike and undertook a
commitment to accept the final settlement. In this manner authority was
accorded to the mediator-arbitrator to arrive at a settlement if the parties
failed to arrive at a settlement by themselves.204
Until this point med-arb developed in four central arenas: labor
disputes,205 international arbitration,206 corporate disputes, and family and
estate disputes. Various countries, such as China, Germany, and
Switzerland, use various forms of med-arb in international disputes.207
Countries such as Brazil, China and Hong Kong have even enacted
arbitration legislation including provisions relating to med-arb. In the arena
of corporate disputes, med-arb has proven itself to be effective for certain
kinds of disputes. A survey of ADR habits among conglomerates that was
conducted in 1997 demonstrates the importance of med-arb in this sector.
Forty percent of those participating in the survey responded that they had
participated in med-arb processes.208 In internal corporate disputes, such as
conflicts between shareholders, med-arb has also been found to be

204. Id. The agreement that was arrived at promoted stability in employee–employer
relationships in industry. Id.
205. In the arena of labor disputes med-arb is very developed, since it equalizes the power of
management and the workers through compromises and concessions. In other words, it developed
due to a particular quid pro quo dynamic. The idea is that management agrees to set up a grievance
procedure ending in binding arbitration, while the workers give up their right to strike. In the arena
of labor disputes med-arb has been successful precisely in resolving disputes regarding contractual
interests in the areas in which the right to strike is limited or denied altogether. Id. at 32–33.
206. Med-arb has had a great deal of success in the international arena as well. In inter-cultural
commercial disputes, an integrated method with two phases, like med-arb, is preferable, in that it is
more successful in overcoming cultural differences. Beyond the cultural differences, med-arb saves
time and money and preserves the business and social relations, which are so important in
international relations. See Carlos de Vera, Arbitration Harmony: “Med-Arb” and the Confluence
of Culture and Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 18
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 149, 154 (2004).
207. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 33. One case that received international publicity in the
wake of the successful use of med-arb was the dispute between IBM and Fujtisu. In this
complicated dispute regarding intellectual property rights, with hundreds of millions of dollars at
stake, the two arbitrators who were appointment by the parties, within a forum of three arbitrators,
carried out the mediation with the parties and afterwards used several innovative methods of ADR to
settle the dispute, finally resolving the dispute. According to the scholars, this case illustrates the
potential contained in med-arb when used as an effective tool to identify and clarify facts in dispute,
thus contributing to reducing the number of issues in dispute and saving resources of time and
money. This dispute also illustrates the importance of the openness of the neutral third party to all of
the possibilities for more effective fashioning of the process for the needs of the parties. Id.
208. Id.
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appropriate.209 The integration of the cooperative aspects of an agreement
with the finality of the process that med-arb accords, has been found to offer
many advantages in the context of corporate disputes. Med-arb prevents
harm to the corporation; it creates incentives for the parties to behave with
less hostility, to be more creative, and to develop mutual trust.210
In the fourth arena of family disputes, which is the area relevant to this
article - med-arb is developing because the judicial process cannot provide
an appropriate solution due to the emotional nature of the disputes, and the
long-term and expensive qualities of the disputes. The legal system is
perceived by many experts as escalating the dispute and contributing to
long-lasting hostility.211 Med-arb is perceived as appropriate in disputes of
this nature since it saves time and money, is carried out privately and is
suitable for sensitive subjects, as it encourages the building of relationships
instead of destroying them and escalating conflict. The additional value of
med-arb over the mediation process (which also has these advantages) is that
it contributes to the finality of the deliberations and the determination.
Although in the arena of family disputes med-arb is still in its initial stages,
and there has not yet been any in-depth study regarding its application,
voices regarding its alleged advantages are already being heard.212
Despite studies alleging the relatively slow development of the med-arb
process and the narrow sectors that it serves, there are not many categories
that are automatically and absolutely excluded from it. The question of
whether or not it is appropriate depends on the circumstances and the parties
involved in the specific dispute. It is possible to assume that in view of the
trend of development of the ADR movement and due to the increasing
tendency of the courts to refer disputes in that direction, the med-arb process
will also increase in popularity and will become an effective and preferred
tool for conflict resolution.213
B. The Advantages of Med-Arb, its Disadvantages and Means of Dealing
with Them
The international scholarly discourse regarding med-arb points to the
inherent advantages of the process alongside its alleged disadvantages.
These must be taken into consideration if the thesis of this article in favor of
the adoption of med-arb as a solution for divorce cases involving violence is
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Yolanda Vorys, The Best of Both Worlds: The Use of Med-Arb for Resolving Will
Disputes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 871, 871–72 (2007).
212. Id. at 873–74.
213. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 33.
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to be accepted. What is interesting is that the same characteristic of the
process—its hybrid nature which combines mediation and arbitration—
serves both the proponents and the opponents of the process. While this
hybrid nature is presented by the proponents as the central advantage of the
process, the critics of med-arb assert that by combining mediation with
arbitration into one process, the relative advantages of each of these
processes alone is lost. The critics assert that this combination creates both
practical and ethical problems, as detailed below.
(a) Efficiency and Finality of the Proceedings as Opposed to
Impairment of Neutrality
Efficiency is perceived as one of the obvious advantages of med-arb.
The dual role of the mediator-arbitrator makes the process more efficient
than separate mediation and arbitration processes since the single mediatorarbitrator does not have to begin from the starting point and the same issues
do not have to be raised again.214 Unlike mediation alone, in med-arb, the
mediator-arbitrator can use his understandings of the relationship between
the parties and their interests that he acquired during the mediation process
in reaching a suitable solution during arbitration. Moreover, the finality of
the proceeding is one of the prominent advantages of the med-arb process.
Unlike “pure” mediation, the med-arb process, like arbitration, ensures a
final determination. The settlement agreement that the parties reach at the
end of the mediation stage of the process is binding and can be legally
enforced. The certain knowledge that the dispute will end constitutes an
enormous advantage from the perspective of the parties and in terms of the
process.215
However, just as it contributes to efficiency, the duality of the role of the
mediator-arbitrator also leads to criticism regarding the potential impairment
of his neutrality. In pure mediation, confidentiality is one of the basic
principles of the process. There are legislative enactments that regulate the
behavior of the mediators and even impose serious restrictions on the use
that may be made of information disclosed during the process.216 In the
arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator must base his award solely upon facts
that are considered relevant to his award. By contrast, in med-arb, the

214.
215.
216.

De Vera, supra note 207, at 156.
Blankenship, supra note 198, at 34–35.
De Vera, supra note 207, at 157–58.
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mediator-arbitrator is exposed to a variety of information during the
mediation stage. This includes confidential information pertaining not just
to the case but also regarding the parties’ interests, that is not disclosed in
the course of ordinary arbitration, such as intimate, emotional or personal
information, which is not relevant in the strictly legal sense,217 as well as
privileged information provided to the mediator-arbitrator, without the
presence of the other party, in the caucuses that take place during the
mediation stage.218 While this does not create a problem for the mediator in
a pure mediation proceeding, which does not end with an award by the
mediator, in med-arb the exposure to this kind of information is likely to
sway the mediator-arbitrator in favor of one party and to adversely affect the
results of the proceeding219 since it is not realistic to expect him to block out
(consciously or sub-consciously) all critical information provided during the
mediation stage. The concern is therefore that the mediator-arbitrator will
be unable to remain neutral when he must render his award during the
arbitration stage insofar as he has information from the earlier mediation
stage, which would never have been disclosed in a pure arbitration
proceeding. The response of the proponents of med-arb is that such
information is likely to influence only a mediator-arbitrator who is, in any
event, weak, i.e., who is not sufficiently skilled, professional or experienced.
Confidential information disclosed in the course of the mediation is not more
dangerous in arbitration than in a situation in which a judge or arbitrator (in
arbitration that is not part of med-arb) must ignore evidence that they heard
but later determined was inadmissible.220 Additionally, it is possible to leave
freedom of choice in the hands of the parties and their attorneys. They will
choose a mediator-arbitrator whom they trust and consider to be
professional, skilled and experienced at exercising his authority
appropriately (and who will not abuse it).

217. Id.
218. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 35.
219. Moreover, the other party does not know what was said in the caucuses, and therefore he is
unable to refute the information during the arbitration phase. This is considered to be a serious
breach in terms of justice and the fairness of the process. See Edna Sussman, Developing an
Effective Med-Arb/Arb-Med Process, 2 N.Y. DISP. RESOL. LAWYER 71, 71 (2009).
220. See Vorys, supra note 212, at 895–96 (presuming that a judge or arbitrator has the ability
to ignore inadmissible evidence and to give it no weight in their final decision); Blankenship, supra
note 198, at 35-36. Although it is possible to argue with this presumption, both intuitively and
empirically (see the studies of Jerome Frank: Jerome Frank, The Judging Process and the Judge’s
Personality, in Law and The Modern Mind 100–18 (1930); JEROME FRANK, Court On Trial-Myth
and Reality in American Justice (Princeton, 1949)), still, the proponents of med-arb argue that it is
not appropriate to demand (or expect) more from a mediator–arbitrator than what is demanded from
a judge.

134

https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss1/4

44

Lavi: Divorce Involving Domestic Violence: Is Med-Arb Likely to be the

[Vol. 14: 91, 2014]
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL

Moreover, one must remember that the parties are entitled to fashion the
proceeding as they see fit, and they have the means to use protective
measures or various models of med-arb in order to deal with the issue of
confidentiality. The parties may choose the model of med-arb according to
which a different person serves in each role of mediator and arbitrator.
Proponents of med-arb assert that the model of “same-neutral med-arb”
(using the same person as mediator and arbitrator) is not mandatory. There
is no necessity that the mediator also serve as the arbitrator in the case. The
parties may decide on a different model of med-arb, such as “opt-out medarb,” in which, at the conclusion of the mediation stage and prior to the
beginning of the arbitration stage, each of the parties is entitled to request
that someone else be appointed as arbitrator. In this manner, many of the
concerns and ethical dilemmas regarding the issue of neutrality of the
mediator-arbitrator are likely to be resolved.221
(b) Flexibility of the Process as Opposed to Impairment of its Fairness
The flexibility of the process is one of its most significant advantages,
and there are those who believe that med-arb is the most flexible of all of the
existing ADR processes.222 The med-arb process is considered flexible since
it enables the transition from mediation to arbitration, a return to mediation
and again going on to arbitration. Even at the arbitration stage the arbitrator
can go back to his role as a mediator in order to deal with specific issues.
All of this is according to the med-arb model that the parties choose at the
outset of the process.223 The combination of arbitration and mediation
221. However, there is other criticism of this differential model. The argument is that where
the mediator and the arbitrator are not the same person, this will adversely affect the two phases,
both in terms of the parties’ conduct and that of the mediator. The assertion is that in this model the
parties were more hostile and suggested fewer new alternatives for dealing with dispute and even the
mediator was less active and less involved. See Vorys, supra note 211 at 894-895.
222. Gerald F. Phillips, Same-Neutral Med-Arb: What Does The Future Hold? 60(2) DISP.
RESOL. J. 24, 29 (2005). Clearly, a model similar to this one is likely to make the med-arb process
more expensive.
223. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 33 . The frequency of these transitions and their timing is
also a function of the parties’ choice. There are various options, as Blankenship notes: “This is an
interesting process in which there is an opportunity to conduct a separate mediation during an
ongoing arbitration. It is possible for the mediation to occur at any time during the arbitration, i.e.,
between the hearings, and on more than one occasion. The ability to mediate at different times, on
more than one occasion or not at all, makes this med-arb format extremely flexible and creative,
especially, if the same neutral is used throughout, though the parties are obviously free to use a
separate neutral to mediate by having a mediator “on call,” so to speak.” Id. at 32.
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enables the parties to fashion a process that is custom-made for the
circumstances of the dispute between them and to choose a suitable neutral
mediator-arbitrator as they desire. In addition, the flexibility of this process
can also be seen in the broad spectrum of solutions that it provides to the
parties, insofar as it is an outgrowth, to begin with, of mediation. This
spectrum is broader than what is likely to be available in a regular arbitration
process on its own.224
It is precisely in this context that one of the criticisms voiced in the
scholarly literature asserts that there is a potential for impairing the integrity
of the process, because in arbitration the arbitrator is supposed to make his
determination solely on the basis of the evidence presented in the hearings at
which both sides were present. In this manner, each party can object to the
evidence submitted by the other party. Critics of med-arb believe that the
very existence of such a possibility is inconsistent with one of the basic
requirements of a fair process.225 When the mediator-arbitrator considers
this information in the context of his award in the arbitration proceeding, it
is as if he is allowing false testimony to influence his award. In other words,
the rules of admissibility and procedural defenses available to the parties in
proceedings based upon a judgment (such as a judicial proceeding or even
the partial defenses that the parties are likely to adopt in an arbitration
proceeding in spite of the basic exemption from both the substantive and
procedural law in the arbitration proceeding) are not available to them due to
the unique character of the med-arb proceeding. In response, the proponents
of med-arb assert that the concerns regarding the inherent harm to the
propriety of the med-arb process are exaggerated, if not utterly baseless.
While it is true that the normal procedural defenses are not available to the
parties, they are replaced by other defenses such as: the full disclosure to the
parties at the outset of the proceeding regarding the nature of the proceeding
(including its weak points) and the role of the mediator-arbitrator; informed
consent or waiver; correct fashioning of the proceeding in order for it to
accommodate the choices of the parties and the particular circumstances;
and, their and their attorneys’ choice of a neutral mediator-arbitrator, who is

In addition to the option of a transition in med-arb from arbitration back to mediation at any time
during the arbitration, there are scholars who do not rule out the option of going back to mediation
even at the stage of rendering the arbitration award! Gerald Phillips, who serves as a mediatorarbitrator in Los Angeles, demonstrates a case in which after he had not succeeded in mediating a
dispute until its conclusion, the arbitration phase began, and after he had made the arbitration award
regarding the granting of a permanent injunction to the plaintiff, he went back again and assisted the
parties as a mediator regarding the terms of the order. The parties were extremely satisfied with the
outcome. Id.
224. Phillips, supra note 223, at 25.
225. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 36.
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trustworthy and skilled.226 According to the proponents of the process, even
if the propriety of the proceeding is not necessarily completely protected, it
is still sufficient in order to substantially limit the danger as well as to
actualize the right of the parties to self-definition and to choose a proceeding
whose advantages far outweigh its alleged dangers.
(c) Incentive for Settlement as Opposed to Coercion
Studies show a further advantage of the med-arb process is that it
provides an incentive for the parties to reach a settlement agreement.227
There are proponents who believe that the authority of the mediatorarbitrator in effect reduces the risk that issues will remain unresolved after
the stage of mediation, when he will have to render an arbitration judgment.
In other words, the presence of the mediator-arbitrator and the threat of an
arbitration judgment create a tremendous incentive for the parties to resolve
their difficulties in mediation.228 A further positive influence of med-arb is
the conduct of the parties during the phase of mediation. Aside from the
incentive to reach a settlement agreement, med-arb also provides an
incentive to behave honestly and fairly during the stage of mediation,
knowing that if they fail to reach a settlement agreement they will forfeit
their control of the outcome.229 There are even those who assert that using
direct “force” serves as an incentive for the parties to relate with greater
seriousness to the mediation stage and to cooperate in the hope that they can
impress the mediator-arbitrator.230
However, and precisely on this point, criticism is raised with respect to
the coercive aspect of the process, which is the product of the “power” of the
mediator-arbitrator. The assertion is that the authority accorded to the same
person who is trying to mediate between the parties to render a coerced
judgment, as well his ability to threaten terminating the mediation process at
any time (e.g., if the parties are not making progress and in order to move
onto the arbitration phase), grants him a great deal of power. The critics
assert that this combination is likely to result in the mediator-arbitrator
forcing his opinion on the parties, and that the end result of the mediation
226. Regarding informed consent see infra notes 241–43 and accompanying text.
227. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 34.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Sherry Landry, Med-Arb: Mediation with a Bite and an Effective ADR Model, DEF.
COUNS. J. 263, 266 (1996) .
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phase is likely to be a forced settlement agreement, thereby compromising
the volitional nature of the process and the parties’ participation and genuine
satisfaction.231 The assertion is that the component of coercion in the medarb process is an inherent flaw in the process, and that the agreements that
the parties arrive at during the mediation phase are the product of pressure
applied by the mediator-arbitrator and therefore they cannot be volitional.232
According to one response voiced against this alleged disadvantage,
empirical studies of the med-arb process have demonstrated that most of the
mediators-arbitrators who were observed were not especially directive
during the mediation phase. They concentrated their pressure tactics at the
end of the sessions, more as a last ditch effort to rescue a failed mediation
than as a policy of aggressive facilitation.233
Another response to the allegation of coercion is that a certain degree of
coercion in the med-arb process is not necessarily undesirable. Quite the
opposite, it can even be beneficial as long as the participation in med-arb is
not coerced.234 In other words, as long as the parties understand the med-arb
process and are aware of its characteristics, and as long as they choose
volitionally to give the mediator-arbitrator the authority attributed to his
position, the potential disadvantages of the process are likely to disappear,
and they are even likely to become advantages. There are those who assert
that the “muscle” that the mediator-arbitrator has is likely to encourage more
effective and productive mediation precisely because the parties are aware of
his authority and of the possibility that he will use his authority if they do
not themselves arrive at a solution of the conflict.235 In other words, their
knowledge regarding the mediator-arbitrator’s muscle is likely to positively
influence their productivity during the mediation phase of the process. It is
precisely in divorce cases involving violence that the correctness of this
assertion stands out, as shall be discussed below.236
(d) Conduct of the Parties to the Proceeding
Another contention against med-arb relates to the conduct of the parties.
The critics assert that during mediation the parties will be afraid to disclose

231. Bartel, supra note 202, at 679.
232. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 36.
233. Vorys, supra note 212, at 895.
234. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 36. See Bartel, supra note 202, at 681–82.
235. Vorys, supra note 212, at 895. See also Blankenship, supra note 198, at 36 (describing
that some degree of pressure is productive and can become advantages, as long as the parties
understand the process and its characteristics and choose of their own free will to give the mediator–
arbitrator the authority and power included in this role).
236. See infra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
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information that they would disclose in a pure mediation proceeding,
because of the arbitration proceeding looming in the future. They assume
that unlike mediation, which requires openness and sincerity, the arbitration
proceeding requires parties to act in a calculated manner. Unlike the
mediator, who builds the process in reliance upon the openness of the
parties, their true intentions, their interests, their preferences, and their
business background, the arbitrator is supposed to render a judgment
between them. Because the parties are aware of the judicial power of the
mediator-arbitrator, and out of their fear lest at the stage of the ruling he uses
the information that they disclosed during the mediation stage against them,
they will refrain from fully cooperating during the mediation stage.237
Countering this contention, the proponents of med-arb assert that there is no
empirical basis for this concern, and that quite the opposite, there are
empirical studies that point to the openness of the parties in the med-arb
proceeding.238 Other criticism relating to the parties’ conduct in the med-arb
proceeding, concerns the manipulative behavior of the parties. The assertion
is that if one of the parties wishes to end the mediation phase and to go on to
the arbitration phase, he is likely to force this on the other party through his
lack of cooperation in carrying out the negotiations during the mediation
phase. Such manipulation can also be used in pure mediation in order to
bring the proceeding to its conclusion, but the studies show that the risk that
such manipulation will occur is greater in the med-arb proceeding.239
Proponents of med-arb respond by stating that the volitional nature of the
proceeding demonstrates that the parties are familiar with the process, trust
the mediator-arbitrator and intend to cooperate with him, and that they
understand that a lack of integrity on their part or any other manipulative
strategy is first and foremost harmful to themselves, insofar as these are
strategies that harm the proceeding itself. If this answer is insufficient, and
the concern regarding manipulation still exists, the parties are likely to
include in the med-arb agreement a provision pursuant to which each party
must disclose before the other party and before the mediator-arbitrator all
relevant information and must refrain from strategies of disinformation.
One of the solutions scholars have proposed as a general solution to the
criticism of the med-arb process and to address many of the disadvantages
237. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 36-–37.
238. Id. at 37. For a more expansive treatment see Neil B. McGillicuddy et al., Third-Party
Intervention: A Field Experiment Comparing Three Different Models, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 104, 110 (1987).
239. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 37.
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attributed to it is prior to starting the proceeding, the parties sign an
informative document regarding the risks and ethical dilemmas involved in
such a hybrid process. In California, the ADR Practice Guide includes an
informative document of this nature. The parties who sign it prior to
beginning the med-arb declare that it has been brought to their attention that
the mediator-arbitrator may be influenced by the confidential information
brought before him during the mediation phase and that: “The parties
understand that this process will likely cause the arbitrator to receive
information that might not otherwise have been received as evidence in the
arbitration and to receive information confidentially from each of the parties
that may not be disclosed to the other side.”240
Similarly, in this document, the parties undertake not to sue the
mediator-arbitrator or to attack the results of the med-arb on the basis of
these risks. My proposal is, therefore, that the parties sign a med-arb
document that will attest to their informed consent to the process and to the
mediator-arbitrator’s consent to serve at the outset as a mediator, and to act
according to the principles of med-arb detailed above and set forth in such a
document. The importance of this document is in its assurance that if the
parties are interested in the med-arb process, it is only after all of the risks
and ethical dilemmas that may arise during this hybrid process were brought
to their knowledge and understood prior to giving their informed consent to
them.241 The document is also important because it affords protection to the
mediator-arbitrator due to the parties’ waiver of the right to file an action
against the mediator-arbitrator, and limits the mediator-arbitrator’s liability
to instances in which he has breached his duty to act with neutrality and in
good faith. The parties similarly waive the right to challenge the results of
the med-arb—both the mediation settlement agreement and the arbitration
agreement—as part of strengthening the objective of finality of the process.
The proposed med-arb document242 (which can be conditioned upon,
changed and fashioned according to the needs of the parties in any given
case) should include the following basic elements:
(1) The consent of the parties to use the med-arb process and the services of the
mediator-arbitrator (specified by name), who they chose to resolve the dispute between
them.
(2) Definition of the role of the mediator-arbitrator as a mediator in the first phase of the
proceeding, who will assist the parties in arriving at a mediation settlement to resolve the
dispute between them, without his having the authority, during the mediation phase, to

240. Phillips, supra note 223, at 27.
241. For a similar idea regarding the adoption of “informed consent” with respect to the
mediation process see Orna Deutch, ‘Informed Consent’ in Mediation, 3(1) SHA’AREI MISHPAT 47,
57–59 (2002) .
242. For a similar model see Phillips, supra note 223, at 31.
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render any binding determination or decision whatsoever regarding the subjects of the
dispute between the parties.
(3) A declaration from the mediator-arbitrator regarding his commitment to act in good
faith and to be neutral, independent of any of the parties and without any personal interest
in the dispute.
(4) A clarification that the mediator-arbitrator is a neutral third party and is not
the
attorney of either of the parties, alongside his commitment not to render
professional
services or legal counsel to any of the parties in any matter related to the dispute that is
the subject of the med-arb.
(5) A clarification that any matter in dispute between the parties and that is not resolved
in the mediation settlement will be transferred to the mediator-arbitrator (whose name
was specified at the beginning of the document) and that his decision shall be binding and
enforceable.
(6) The mediator-arbitrator is exempt from liability for any act of commission or
omission relating to the med-arb proceeding or stemming from it, with the exception of
his duty to act in good faith.
(7) A declaration of the parties that they will not raise any assertion or claim against the
results of the med-arb (the mediation settlement and the arbitration award) or the
mediator-arbitrator pertaining to the fact that the mediator also served as the arbitrator (in
proceedings in which this is indeed the case).
(8) A declaration of the parties that the mediator-arbitrator informed them of the
disadvantages of the process including the risk that the mediator-arbitrator (where this is
the same person) in rendering his arbitration award may be influenced (consciously or
sub-consciously) by confidential information that he received during the mediation phase,
including the caucuses as well as the possibility that the arbitration award will
be
influenced by information that the parties (or one of them) disclosed to the mediatorarbitrator during the mediation phase and that they would not have disclosed to an
arbitrator in a pure arbitration proceeding.
(9) A declaration by the parties that they are represented by their attorneys and that they
are free to consult with them at any point in the proceedings, and that the mediatorarbitrator informed them that they are entitled to choose two different people to serve as
mediator and arbitrator if there are issues that have not been resolved in the mediation
settlement at the conclusion of the mediation phase.

To conclude this section, all of the disadvantages of med-arb are
connected to one another and they all stem from the same root: the same
neutral figure removes his mediator hat upon conclusion of the mediation
phase and puts on the hat of an arbitrator. According to the proponents of
med-arb, the solution to concerns and ethical dilemmas arising from this
situation is not to reject med-arb entirely as a process, but rather to make
intelligent use of the flexibility and possibility for modifications accorded to
the parties and their attorneys. In other words, the underlying assumption is
that the parties need to be free to fashion the proceeding in a manner that
will meet their specific needs, and that their right to self-definition takes
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precedence over rigid procedures and formats. The med-arb proceeding,
according to its proponents,243 encourages creativity and it is designed to be
attentive to the needs of those availing themselves of it. If the parties (with
the assistance of their attorneys) fashion the proceeding in a creative
manner, they are likely to discover that it is flexible, rich with opportunities,
and suitable for use in spite of their initial concerns. For example, there can
be various models for the med-arb process,244 such as the opt-out med-arb
discussed above, which provides an answer to much of the criticism voiced
against med-arb.245 Professional and experienced mediators-arbitrators
provide additional protection to the parties by assisting the parties in
choosing a model of med-arb that will neutralize most of the risks for them
and alleviate their concerns. Similarly, it is possible to set forth in the
preliminary med-arb agreement between the parties various conditions that
will alleviate the specific concerns of the parties in a given case. Further,
proponents argue that prior informed consent of the parties to the proceeding
(especially its results), which makes clear the risks and the roles of all of
those involved, is an answer that serves to overcome the various
disadvantages attributed to it and to provide appropriate protection to the
parties.
Brewer and Lawrence summarize this issue: “In our view, when
consenting adults make such judgments with an informed understanding of
the advantages and the possible disadvantages of the medarb process, they
should be free to contract for the dispute resolution process that seems best
to them.”246
C. The Potential Contribution of Med-Arb to the Issue of Divorce
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence
(a) Med-arb as a Real Remedy: Addressing the Practical Problem
The mediation process, as stated above, in dealing with divorce cases in
the presence of violence presents (or is likely to present) various
disadvantages, which, in many cases cannot be completely resolved, even

243. Blankenship, supra note 198, at 40.
244. For various models of med-arb see id. at 30–32.
245. Like the assertion regarding coercion or the use of excessive force by the mediator, or the
lack of neutrality on his part, or the apprehension of the parties about demonstrating openness and
cooperation during the stage of mediation, because of the knowledge that the same neutral person
will also serve as the arbitrator at the conclusion of the mediation phase. See supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
246. Thomas J. Brewer & Lawrence R. Mills, Combining Mediation and Arbitration, 54(4)
DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 36 (1999) .
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through the spectrum of solutions offered by its proponents, as we termed
this above, “the practical problems.”247 In many cases, med-arb is likely to
address these advantages, as detailed below:
(1) Solutions such as screening disputes, ensuring the mediator’s skill, caucusing, and
expanding a new definition of the mediator’s “duty of neutrality,” etc. were proposed to
248
address the failure of “disparity of power between the parties.”
With respect to “the
249
250
fairness of the mediation settlement,” solutions are limited and questionable.
It seems that med-arb is likely to provide a better solution. Firstly, the mediator’s duty of
neutrality in the classic mediation proceeding (which the opponents of mediation fear will
be breached if the mediator intervenes on behalf of the victim) no longer constitutes a
problem in the case of med-arb. The mediator-arbitrator is likely to terminate the
mediation phase of the proceeding when he feels parties are arriving at a settlement that
is unfair to the victim or are making decisions that do not reflect an appropriate balance
of power between the parties. During the arbitration phase, the arbitrator relies upon his
discretion to render the award only as for those matters, which include the balance of
power that is appropriate in his opinion. In this manner, med-arb achieves both goals: it
preserves neutrality during the mediation phase, and it preserves the fairness of the
settlement and the victim’s rights during the arbitration phase. In fact, what is presented
in general med-arb literature as a disadvantage of the process—”a mediator with
251
muscle” —is not such a great disadvantage (if at all) regarding med-arb in divorce
cases involving violence. In this type of case, a certain element of coercion in the process
is not necessarily negative and can even be advantageous (in comparison to classic
mediation).
Secondly, even though it is not always possible to completely remove the imbalance of
power between the parties, the mediator-arbitrator’s options to intervene and render an
award is likely to prevent the degree of power from being the dominant factor influencing
252
the final results.
The very knowledge that the proceeding grants the victim an option
for third-party intervention to render a determination gives the victim a power, which she
does not have in the classic mediation proceeding. In other words, the weak party has an
additional option to settle in med-arb. In this manner, med-arb contributes to resolving
the problem of the disparity of power between the parties that exists in classic mediation.
(2) The fact that the mediator-arbitrator is a mediator with muscle, as stated in the
253
previous paragraph,
is likely to be an advantage in divorce cases involving violence
254
with respect to another problem attributed to mediation—the component of danger.
This problem, as stated, cannot be completely eradicated, in spite of the attempts to do so

247. See supra (a) Practical Problems.
248. See supra ii. The mediator’s skills.
249. Landrum, supra note 10, at 443 (“Victims’ advocates and feminist scholars have also
expressed concerns that a history of domestic violence can so taint a mediation session that any
agreement arrived at is likely to be unfair to the victim.”).
250. See supra (a) Practical Problems.
251. See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text.
252. Vorys, supra note 212, at 882.
253. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
254. See supra i. The Component of Danger.
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255

(such as the solution of ODR).
The mediator-arbitrator’s muscle is likely to influence
the violent party to restrain himself, because if he does not do so, there may no longer
have control over the results once the mediation phase is abandoned for the arbitration
phase, with the attendant binding award of the arbitrator. Med-arb is even likely to
reduce the force of this problem when the victim asks to withdraw from the mediation
proceeding after it has already begun. In the classic mediation proceeding, such a
situation is likely to increase the danger awaiting the victim, both because of her refusal
to continue the dialogue in the mediation setting, and because in most cases, the handling
of the case is transferred to the court for a judicial proceeding. As stated above, some
assert that it is precisely the judicial proceeding that escalates the conflict between the
256
parties and in effect, increases the danger awaiting the wife from her violent husband.
In the med-arb proceeding, even where the mediation phase ends, the proceeding itself is
not terminated and certainly is not transferred to the court; rather, the parties continue
to the arbitration phase. Thus, the problem of the danger component is weakened.
257
(3) An additional problem is the preservation of the power paradigm.
Some argue
that mediation, being a volitional process throughout, is likely to contribute to preserving
the mold of the abuser-victim relationship because it provides a platform for the
aggressive party. Med-arb is not a volitional process all the way through, but rather,
includes the coercive arbitration phase where needed, resolving this problem by
definition.
(4) The common denominator of additional problems existing in classic mediation—
cheapening and distorting the phenomenon of domestic violence, as well as the feminist
258
argument, as set forth above —is the wrong message of tolerance that society
supposedly transmits by allowing divorce cases involving domestic violence to be
handled in a mediation process. As one of the scholars stated, this sends a message to the
specific parties and to the general public that domestic violence is acceptable, and that it
259
is the fault of both of the parties, or it is simply a private matter between a man and his
wife within the privacy of their own home.

Med-arb constitutes a balancing solution that is beneficial all around. It
transmits a strong and uncompromising message in the form of the
arbitrator’s decision rendered by a third party, instead of the tolerant
message that classic mediation transmits. It also contributes to the
empowerment of the victim during the mediation phase and assists her “to
have more of a voice in what happens to her future.”260 This addresses the
feminist argument of the opponents of mediation with its own feminist
argument.
However, this is not sufficient. In this article I argue that beyond
dealing with the disadvantages of mediation, med-arb has distinct
advantages of its own that have added value precisely in divorce cases
involving domestic violence, as detailed below:
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–04 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 105–07, 111–16 and accompanying text.
Landrum, supra note 10, at 445.
Id.
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(1) The first advantage is the finality of the proceeding.
This advantage of med-arb is
of paramount importance especially in divorce cases involving violence—where one
party, the victim, has an urgent need to dissolve the bond, whereas the other party, due to
his desire to continue to control, is not necessarily interested in doing so. The fact that at
the conclusion of the proceeding the connection between the parties will be terminated at
the conclusion of the proceeding, whether through a mediation settlement or an
arbitration decision, gives the victim a distinct advantage that classic mediation cannot
promise her. If the classic mediation proceeding fails and does not end in a settlement,
this forces the victim to go to the court in order to dissolve the bond, requiring her to start
everything from the beginning.
262
(2) The advantage of efficiency in med-arb,
expressed in findings in the field as well,
is that it saves time and money as compared to independent and separate mediation and
arbitration proceedings because the same person serves as mediator and as arbitrator, and
due to the continuity between the two proceedings. Med-arb results in relatively quick
263
results and the price that the parties are required to pay is fair.
The economic
advantage for the victim in divorce cases is important because, in many cases, she was
subject to financial abuse in addition to the physical or psychological abuse.
Additionally, the speed with which the bond is dissolved is likely to have practical
implications in terms of limiting the element of danger to the victim. This advantage is
certainly significant for the victim of domestic violence seeking divorce.
(3) A further advantage of the med-arb process is the flexibility of the process
that
264
enables a transition from mediation to arbitration, back to mediation, and so forth.
This advantage is particularly valuable in divorce cases involving domestic violence
because the terms of the mediation settlement are likely to change according to the shift
in circumstances: unexpected behavior of the violent party, a varying level of violence, a
varying balance of powers between the parties, the confidence that the victim is likely to
acquire or lose in the course of the proceeding, etc. As one of the scholars points out:
“As a couple moves through the mediation process or other legal proceedings, the
265
situation could quickly change.”

Therefore, preserving flexibility is of the utmost importance. The
possibility of a prior agreement, in which the mediator will be authorized to
go from the mediation phase to the arbitration phase and back again, is a
special advantage that does not exist in the normal mediation proceeding. In
the scholarly literature of recent years, it is repeatedly expressed that there is
no one correct solution for every divorce case involving violence, and that

261. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
262. Id.
263. David C. Elliott, Med/Arb: Fraught with Danger or Ripe with Opportunity?, 34 ALTA L.
REV. 163, 164 (1995) .
264. See supra (b) Flexibility of the process as opposed to impairment of its fairness.
265. Landrum, supra note 10, at 440 (“As a couple moves through the mediation process or
other legal proceedings, the situation could quickly change.”).
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each case must be considered on its merits.266 It should be remembered that
at times this is even true of the same couple over the course of time. It
certainly may be that a case (or certain matters at issue) that began in
mediation is no longer appropriate for this proceeding. The transition
between mediation and arbitration and back again, which is possible in a
med-arb proceeding, is, therefore, a significant advantage precisely for
divorce cases involving violence.
(b) Exchanging the Safety Net—Addressing the Conceptual Problem
As presented in the previous chapter,267 the conceptual problem in the
existing situation rests upon two parts of the argument.
One part of the argument points to the need to look for a third solution
in divorce cases involving violence, in view of the problems arising from
making do with the two customary alternatives—the judicial process or
mediation. The argument is that in view of the substantive disadvantages of
both of these alternatives, a third, more appropriate, alternative is necessary.
The answer to this can be found in the med-arb process and adapting it
to deal with divorce cases involving violence. In other words, med-arb is
likely to provide a third, more appropriate solution. Firstly, it seems that for
the most part the med-arb process constitutes a more appropriate solution
than the judicial process.
As the advanced scholarly literature
demonstrates,268 in a comparison between the judicial process and the
mediation process for dealing with divorce cases involving violence, it
seems that the general balance tips towards the latter. Moreover, studies
show that the rate of success of mediation in divorce cases involving
violence is quite similar to the rate of success of mediation in other kinds of
cases.269 The data demonstrates a rate of success in dispute resolution that
varies from 51% to 76%. Additionally, couples in both violent and
nonviolent relationships report satisfaction from the mediation process, the
settlement agreement that was reached, and the level at which agreements

266. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 147, 159–204; see Elayne E. Greenberg, The Defining
Ingredient : Transformative Mediation Ideology in Parenting Coordination Practice, 271 (2011),
available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1825435; see also Rogers, supra note 36, at 349 (“Recently,
feminist writers have recognized the need to respond to gendered violence ‘by providing multiple
options for survivors [of sexual violence], rather than one single cookie-cutter response.’”)
267. See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
268. See also infra note 275 and accompanying text.
269. Ver Steegh, supra note 5, at 190.
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were carried out.270 Therefore, med-arb, which starts out as mediation, is
certainly preferable to the judicial process.
In addition, in view of what is stated in section (a) of this chapter,271 the
med-arb process is certainly preferable to mediation because it addresses
many of the disadvantages of the latter,272 and offers distinct advantages
especially in divorce cases involving violence, as stated above.273
The second part of the argument points to the problem inherent in
viewing the judicial process as the “safety net” of the mediation process
(when the inherent disadvantages of the mediation process that cannot be
completely resolved, arise). In order to resolve one problem, another one
has been created. In other words, mediation was initially proposed as an
alternative to the judicial process in divorce cases involving violence, due to
the limitations of the latter. How, therefore, can returning to the judicial
process be presented as a remedy for the disadvantages of mediation? Is it
appropriate for a limited process that was abandoned (at least partially) in
favor of an alternative, to be used to correct the disadvantages of that same
alternative?
The response to the first part of this argument can also be found in medarb. Med-arb substitutes arbitration for the safety net of the judicial process
offered in mediation. In med-arb, if the mediation phase fails, the parties
automatically go on to the arbitration phase, which is structured within the
process, and do not avail themselves of the judicial process. The victim
knows in advance that even if the mediation does not succeed, then
arbitration will serve as her safety net and she will not be forced to pay the
price of returning to the judicial process (as a safety net). Such knowledge is
likely to encourage her to try the mediation process without fear of the risk
of failure, or the further risk accompanying such failure—the return to the
judicial process.
Further, the importance of the safety net for the victim in the case of
total or partial failure of the mediation cannot be overemphasized; to the
safety net increases the spectrum of cases in which victims find the strength
to turn to this process as the most appropriate means to dissolve their
connection to their abusers. As the scholarly discourse instructs, there is a

270. Id. In one study, 80% reported satisfaction from the process. Id. Other studies found that
women tended to have a greater level of satisfaction, and that couples felt that communications
between them had improved. Id.
271. See supra (a) Med-Arb as a Real Remedy: Addressing the “Practical Problem.”
272. See supra notes 248–61 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 262–67 and accompanying text.
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preference for mediation when handling divorce cases with violence. As
Greenberg notes,
Critics of alternative dispute resolution, recounting horrors resulting from poorly trained
neutrals, forced cooperation when it was unsafe to do so, and invalidation of the abuse
experienced, have argued that alternative dispute resolution forums are dangerous
options. And yes, just like in court, serious mistakes have been made. However, the
concerns have been heeded, lessons have been learned, and modifications have been
274
made to provide a safer, more responsive process.

Therefore, good security net (in the form of the arbitration proceeding
that comes at the end of the med-arb process) will be accorded to more
victims if they have the courage to choose the more appropriate process—
mediation—over the alternative—the judicial proceeding.
Moreover, instead of referring parties to the judicial process from the
outset or as a result of the failure of the mediation, this article proposes the
option of remaining entirely within the sphere of ADR by choosing med-arb.
The med-arb process is composed both of mediation and arbitration, both of
which are defined as types of ADR. As scholars note: “Empowerment and
self-determination, hallmarks of alternative dispute resolution, are an
appealing option for those who prefer to rely on their own decision-making
capacities, in lieu of those of a judge.”275
It would be impossible to exaggerate the importance of empowerment
and the return of control over the process and over her life in general for
victims of domestic violence.276 The med-arb proceeding, therefore, opens
the possibility of being totally removed from the judicial process and
remaining within ADR! Even if the mediation phase fails, the victim will
still remain within the field of ADR, under the umbrella of the arbitration
process. Moreover, many victims do not wish to press criminal charges
against their attackers due to concerns about privacy and the impact such a
step will have on their family.277 Victims of domestic violence might
consider the med-arb process a way to address the problem without exposing
themselves and their family to the polarizing dynamic inherent in the judicial
process.
274. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 617. In continuation of this line of argument, there are those
who assert that advanced writing and thinking on the subject of divorce cases involving violence
does not totally rule out the general mediation process for handling such cases, rather the opposite,
they try to upgrade it, to improve it and to propose a number of options to the judicial process for
handling such cases—”parent education,” “parenting coordination,” and upgraded mediation are
several examples of such options. Id. This article seeks, therefore, to propose an additional option—
med-arb.
275. Id. See also Jeske, supra note 1, at 703 (“Mediation is often cited as a means for parties to
maintain a degree of control over outcomes of their dispute, as opposed to litigation.”).
276. Greenberg, supra note 13, at 617.
277. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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To summarize this point, med-arb offers a significant advantage by
replacing the victim’s safety net in those cases in which the mediation was
unsuccessful. Instead of resorting to the judicial process in such cases, the
victim has another avenue of protection—arbitration. In this manner medarb addresses the conceptual problem, as presented in the previous
chapter.278
CHAPTER SIX: RECOMMENDATIONS
This article proposes adopting med-arb as an additional tool for dealing
with divorce cases involving violence. The recommendation is to apply
med-arb only to those cases where there is informed consent of the victim to
adopt it,279 and only for those cases where a mediation proceeding is suitable
(i.e., to the exclusion of cases of extreme violence).
Moreover, our proposal is to adopt med-arb as an addition to
mechanisms (derived both from the academic discourse and from actual
practice) that were developed and adopted in recent years in order to
improve the mediation process and its results. These mechanisms—
screening, training of mediators, adding security measures, caucusing
frequently, integrating professionals into the process, etc.—have been found,
despite their importance, to be insufficient in many cases, not to say
disappointing. This article seeks, therefore, to add med-arb to the existing
mechanisms.
We also propose on-going and empirical follow-up of the conduct, as
well as the results of the med-arb proceeding in divorce cases involving
violence. The idea is to try to examine the degree of efficiency of the
process as well as its efficacy in such cases, through questionnaires and
surveys of the parties who participated in med-arb proceedings.280 The
questions must be addressed to both parties as well as to the mediatorarbitrator, and they should include questions pertaining to the parties’ level
of satisfaction from the proceeding, its fairness, and the fairness of the result
as they perceive it. The survey should include questions about the short and
long term implications and the results of the med-arb (such as post med-arb
violence or threats of violence), the victim’s sense of security in the course
of the med-arb proceeding, the transitions between the mediation and the
278. See supra (b) Conceptual problems.
279. See supra notes 236–42 and accompanying text.
280. See Landrum, supra note 10, at 468–69. My proposal is based upon a similar proposal to
adopt such surveys in the mediation process.
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arbitration phases of the process, the autonomy of the parties during these
phases, regarding the degree of parties’ cooperation, the degree to which the
mediator-arbitrator conveyed neutrality, the degree of effectiveness of the
results (the mediation settlement together with the arbitration decision), the
procedures or mechanisms that should have been used in the process and
were not, etc.
The promise that med-arb holds for divorce cases involving violence
must be put to the test in the field. Naturally, the med-arb process not only
offers the advantages of mediation and arbitration, but also brings with it the
disadvantages of each. Nevertheless, the holistic approach has already
instructed us that the whole is always greater than the sum of its parts.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
So, why should we be writing about domestic violence again?

We should write about domestic violence because of its growing
phenomenon and seriousness, and in the name of truth, which requires us to
state that the judicial process, in most cases, is not equipped to provide a
solution in such cases. Mediation, which serves as an alternative to
litigation, does not constitute a perfect alternative; there are still substantial
disadvantages, which cannot be completely corrected, despite the developing
literature in the field, and significant efforts for improvement in the field.281
Therefore, this article proposes a third option—med-arb. Along with
the presentation of the med-arb process, its development, its advantages, and
its implementation, this article has also presented its disadvantages and
possible ways of dealing with them. One of them is prior informed consent
of the parties to the process and its results, which, even if it does not
necessarily provide 100% assurance of the propriety of the process, it can
still greatly reduce its dangers and actualize the parties’ right to selfdetermination and the development of their personal autonomy through the
choice of a flexible process fashioned to meet their needs, the advantages of
which would seem to greatly outweigh its disadvantages. Some of the
disadvantages of med-arb (such as the element of coercion) are not
necessarily a disadvantage when dealing with divorce cases involving
violence, whereas some of its advantages (particularly the potential for selfdetermination and empowerment) are likely to accord added value in such
cases and to make a significant contribution for the victims. This article
proposes to carry out on-going, empirical follow-up regarding the process in
the field and its outcomes.

281.

As surveyed in this article. See supra notes 168–91 and accompanying text.
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The importance of the trend, coming both from the academic world and
from the field, seems to find more humane and appropriate solutions for
divorce cases involving violence and the experience of pain for the victims
and their children as far as possible. This article seeks to be part of this
positive trend.

151

Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014

61

